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Reviewing Kato's win in the third Tengen game are (L to R) Fujisawa Shuko, Rin, Kato and Otake. In the background, third from the right, is Abe Yoshiteru 8-dan.

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The cover: A print by Utagawa Kunisada depicting a scene from the 11th century classic 'The Tale of Genji'. From the Narita Collection. Photograph by Nishi Kinya.

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GO WORLD NEWS

Kato Secures the Tengen Title

Kato Masao has made up for losing the Gosei title last summer by defeating his arch-rival Fujisawa Shuko 3-1 in the playoff for the 4th Tengen title. With the Tengen, Honinbo and Judan titles to his credit, Kato once again has his 'normal' complement of three titles.

The title match (best-of-five) between Kato and Shuko revived some of the drama of their Kisei clash and there was a fitting climax to the series when Kato secured the title with a half point win in the fourth game, thus getting his revenge for the half point by which he lost the Kisei title match to Shuko. Once again the Tengen jinx held good and for the fourth time the title was decided by a 3-1 score.

Previous title-winners are Fujisawa Shuko, Kobayashi Koichi and Shimamura Toshihiro.

The results:

Game 1 (8th Nov.) Fujisawa (W) won by ½ point.

Game 2 (22nd Nov.) Kato (W) won by resignation.

Game 3 (29th Nov.) Kato (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (13th Dec.) Kato (W) won by ½ point.

Ishida Wins 26th Oza Title

Ishida Yoshio 9-dan, the ubiquitous title-winner of the early 1970's, has finally made a comeback after more than two years without a title. On the 9th November, 1978, he earned the right to challenge for the Oza title by defeating Rin Kaiho 9-dan, his leading rival earlier in the decade, by 3½ points in the final. In the title match he bested the defender, Kudo Norio 9-dan, by a 2-1 margin, thus winning the Oza title for the second time, as he was also the 22nd Oza.

Ishida the Kisei Challenger


In the third stage of the 3rd Kisei tournament, the cream of the Japanese Go world vied for the right to challenge Fujisawa Shuko for the title, with former Meijin and Honinbo Ishida Yoshio emerging triumphant. In recent months Ishida has shown a return to peak form and so should prove a dangerous opponent for Fujisawa Shuko.

The results:

Quarter-finals. Ishida defeated Chino; Rin d.



Ishida, Sakata and Kudo reviewing the first game of the Oza title match



Ishida Yoshio 9-dan defeats Sakata 9-dan in the third game of the playoff to decide the Kisei challenger.

Shimamura; Sakata d. Kudo; Kato d. Otake.

Semi-finals. Ishida d. Rin; Sakata d. Kato.

Final (best-of-three). Game 1 (Dec. 7). Sakata won by resignation.

Game 2 (Dec. 14). Ishida won by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

Game 3 (Dec. 21). Ishida won by $6\frac{1}{2}$ points.

The best-of-seven title match has already begun and the defender, Fujisawa Shuko, has made a good start, winning the first game (played Jan. 12, 13) by $3\frac{1}{2}$ points.

34th Honinbo League

The four players remaining from the 33rd league are Ishida, Takemiya, Rin and Kobayashi Koichi. They are joined by Kudo, Sakata, Takagi Shoichi 8-dan and Sakai Takeshi 8-dan. This is Sakai's first appearance in a league, while Takagi was a member of the 32nd league. Kudo has regained his place immediately after his setback in the 33rd league, while Sakata makes a welcome reappearance after his surprising absence from the 33rd league. A major shock was the defeat

of Otake Meijin in the penultimate elimination round.

A significant result in the first round was the defeat of former Honinbo Takemiya by another former Honinbo, Rin Kaiho.

Yamashiro 6-dan Enters Meijin League

Yamashiro Hiroshi 6-dan, of the Central Japan (Nagoya) branch of the Nihon Ki-in, has created a stir by becoming the youngest player ever to win a place in a league. Yamashiro has fought his way into the 4th Meijin league by defeating in turn Tainaka 9-dan, Fujisawa Kisei and, in the final round, his teacher Shimamura Toshihiro 9-dan. Since Yamashiro's 21st birthday is not until the 12th August this year, he has lowered the record of Kato Masao, who as a 4-dan won a place in the 23rd Honinbo league when he was almost 21.

The other two new entrants in the league are Ushinohama Satsuo 9-dan, of the Kansai Ki-in, playing in his first league at the age of 30, and



Yamashiro Hiroshi 6-dan

Takemiya Masaki 9-dan, whose previous failure to win a place in the Meijin league has been one of the enigmas of the Go world.

In the first round Yamashiro ran into Takemiya and despite a valiant fight suffered a 4½ point defeat.

Wimmer Promoted to 2-dan

Manfred Wimmer, former Austrian and European champion, has achieved a resounding success in his first year of play as a professional at the Kansai Ki-in, gaining almost immediate promotion to 2-dan. Wimmer secured his promotion in the autumn session of the oteai (ranking tournament) with a win against Nagasaki 2-dan on the 8th November, 1978. This made his oteai record 9 wins, 3 jigo and 4 losses and gave him the points for promotion.

Kerwin's Kisei Success

James Kerwin finished his first year of play as a professional shodan at the Nihon Ki-in with the disappointing record of 3 wins to 9 losses in the oteai, but he has compensated for this by becoming the first Westerner to put his name into the record books of Japanese tournaments. Kerwin scored successive wins against Sakuramoto, Inoue Machiko (1-dan winner in the 3rd Kisei tournament), Sano and Nakamura Kuniko to win the 1-dan section of the 4th Kisei tournament. This success

earns Kerwin a place in the second stage (beginning in May) of this mammoth tournament.

1978 Slovenian Championship

In the 1978 Slovenian championship, held in December, the top placegetters were the following six players:

1. Suc Lojze 4-dan: 6-0
2. Bizjak Igor 5-dan: 5-1
3. Koncer Slobodan 3-dan: 4-2
4. Mutabzija Zoran 5-dan: 4-2
5. Flajs Andrej 3-dan: 4-2
6. Ekart Edo 4-dan: 4-2

Suc will be the Yugoslav representative in the 1st World Amateur Go Championship.

Quebec Go Association Formed

The first official organisation devoted to the promotion of Go in Quebec province, the Association Quebecoise des Joueurs de Go, was legally incorporated in December last year. The body is a member of the government-supported Federation of Recreative Games and it is planning various projects, including the publication of a regular newsletter, to popularise Go. The contact address is:


Tibor Bognar
 Association Quebecoise des Joueurs de Go
 7600 Lajeunesse 511
 Montreal, Quebec H2R 2Z8
 Tel. 514-274-1096

At present there are two clubs in the province, one in Quebec and one in Montreal. The Montreal club meets every Monday at 7pm in the 4th floor coffee shop of the CEGEP Vieux Montreal, 255 East Ontario St.

1978 Canadian Open Go Championships

The 1978 Canadian Open Go Championships were held at the Toronto Go Club from the 28th to the 30th December and resulted in a tie for first place between Se Ju Lee 6-dan, of Toronto, and Paul Selick 5-dan, a former Toronto player now teaching at MIT. A playoff was held on the 31st and was won by Lee.

In a sub-tournament held within the main tournament to determine the Canadian Champion, open only to Canadian citizens, the winner was Paul Selick, who thus becomes the Canadian representative in the 1st World Amateur Go Championship. Second place was taken by Adam Yan 4-dan of Toronto.




*1978 British Champion Matthew Macfadyen 5-dan
(photo Terry Benson)*

1978 British Championship

The 1978 British Championship, played during October and November, was won by Matthew Macfadyen 5-dan, who defeated Brian Castledine 3-dan 3-0 in the playoff. The championship was played between the top two place-getters in the Challenger's League as the 1977 champion, Jon Diamond 6-dan, did not defend the title.

Closing of the London Go Centre

Due to financial difficulties, the London Go Centre, the first full-time Go club in Europe when it was opened in March 1975, was forced to close on October 31st, 1978. During its three and a half years of activity, the centre pro-



*The lowering of the London Go Centre flag
(from the L.G.C. Newsletter No. 19)*

vided an enormous boost to British and to European Go, but the scale of its operations entailed financial pressures which finally became too much for it to bear. Despite the gallant efforts of Iwamoto Kaoru 9-dan, whose original support encouraged the centre's founder Stuart Dowsey to launch this ambitious venture, attempts to keep the centre afloat finally had to be abandoned. Nonetheless, it leaves a legacy of substantial success in promoting the game.

Go Clubs Address List: Changes and Additions

For reasons of space the address list has been omitted from GW10 and the present issue. The following alterations should be made to the list appearing in GW9.

United Kingdom — London

London Go Club: meets at The Inter Varsity Club, 2 The Piazza, Covent Garden, WC2

Cockfosters Go Club, c/- J.E. Allen, 7 Lordship Road, Cheshunt, Herts, EN7 5DR

Imperial College Go Club, c/- R. Cant, 31 Emlyn Wood, W12. Tel.01-743 6014

North West London Go Club, c/- K. Rapley, O.R. Group, British Airways, Bealine House, South Ruislip, Middlesex

Woodford Go Club, c/- A. Grant, 1 Kent St., Plaistow, London E13

Australia

Australian Go Association, c/- Bill Leveritt, Secretary, 41 Gavan St., Ashgrove, QLD 4060; Clive Davies, Treasurer, 35 Park Road, Springwood, NSW 2777

Sydney Go Club (meets Wed. 7pm — 11pm), Chess Centre of NSW, top floor, 232 Sussex St., Sydney. Tel. 290-3115

Tasmanian Go Club, c/- David Evans, 1 Swanston St., New Town, Tasmania 7008. Tel. 28-2342 (night), 20-2392 (day).

U.S.A.

Florida: Miami Go Club — postcode should be 33160

California: San Diego Go Club, 2225, 6th Ave., San Diego, Ca. 92101 (Call Les, 225-0923)

Late News — 3rd Kisei Title

The second game of the 3rd Kisei title match was played on the 24th and 25th of January and the title holder Fujisawa Shuko, holding black, scored a convincing win over the challenger Ishida Yoshio to lead the series 2-0.

The First World Amateur Go Championship


13th – 17th March, 1979

The Nihon Ki-in, Tokyo

On the international scene this year the major event will undoubtedly be the large-scale international amateur tournament being staged in Tokyo in the spring by the Nihon Ki-in and Japan Air Lines. The planning for this event is now in the final stages and in this issue we introduce the competitors in the tournament.

Tournament Details

The tournament will consist of an individual knockout championship among thirty-two amateur players from seven zones. The winner will be awarded the Japan Air Lines Cup and the games from the quarter-finals on will be televised on Japanese TV in a Go program sponsored by Japan Air Lines.



1978 European champion Helmut Hasibeder

Participants

Zone 1: Europe


Walter Zickbauer (President, European Go Federation) – non-playing team captain (Austria)

1978 European Champion – Helmut Hasibeder 5-dan (Austria)

Austria – Helmut Wiltschek 5-dan (2nd, 1978



Helmut Wiltschek of Austria



Fernando Aguilar of Argentina

Austrian championship)

F.R. Germany – Horst Kippe 4-dan (1978 German champion)

France – Jerome Hubert 3-dan (1978 French champion)

Netherlands – Ronald Schlemper 4-dan (1978 Dutch champion)

United Kingdom – Jon Diamond 6-dan (1977 British champion)

U.S.S.R. – V.A. Astashkin 5-dan (1978 champion)

Yugoslavia – Lojze Suc (1978 champion)

Zone 2: North America

Paul Selick 5-dan – 1978 Canadian National Champion

Kyung Wan Kim 7-dan – 1977 U.S. Honinbo


Shin A. Kang – 1978 Eastern Honinbo

Shigeo Matsuhara – 1978 Western Honinbo


Zone 3: South America

T. Arikawa (President, Brazil Ki-in) – team captain
Argentina – Fernando Aguilar 5-dan (1977 Argentina champion) and Daniel Leiberman

Brazil – Shoji Okazaki 5-dan (1st, 2nd Brazil Honinbo) and Toshikatsu Takamori 5-dan




Canadian champion Paul Selick



Ronald Schlemper of Holland – at 18 the youngest competitor

Zone 4: Oceania

William Leveritt, Australia – team captain
Sang Dae Hahn – 1978 Australian champion
Graeme Parmenter 1-dan – 1978 New Zealand champion




New Zealand champion Graeme Parmenter

Zone 5: Republic of Korea

Yong Joo Hwang 5-dan – team captain
Yong Ho Lee 6-dan
Sun Kun Lee 6-dan
Byong Jun Kim 5-dan
Kang Mean Baek 5-dan

Zone 6: Peoples Republic of China

Wei-p'ing Nieh – 1978 Chinese champion



Wei-p'ing Nieh – our tip for first place



King of Japanese amateur players – the legendary Yasunaga – at 78 (playing career 68 years) the oldest competitor

Tsu-te Ch'en 2nd, 1978 Chinese championship
Chai-jui Ch'en – 4th, 1978 Chinese championship
Shang-ming K'ung – 1978 Chinese woman champion



K'ung – the world's top woman player

Zone 7: Japan

Team captain – Ichiro Yoshikuni
Naoshi Narumi 6-dan – 1977 Nihon Ki-in Amateur Champion
Yoshiko Kamekura 6-dan – 1978 Women's Amateur Champion
Fumiaki Imamura 6-dan – 1st, 1978 Nihon Ki-in Amateur championship
Yasuro Kikuchi 7-dan – 2nd, 1978
Hajime Yasunaga 7-dan – 3rd, 1978
Bunsho Murakami 7-dan – 4th, 1978

* * * * *

Note 1. The team captains for North America and China have not yet been decided.

Note 2. All names on pages 6 and 7 are given with the surname last.

Note 3. The tournament will be conducted according to the Nihon Ki-in rules, except that the rules concerning the concluding of a game have been modified for this tournament. An English translation of the rules will be provided.

Special Game Commentary

1. Kato Masao

This article, the first of a series, is a simple discussion of a professional game designed for kyu players. The aim is to give some insight into the complexities of top level championship Go by analysing in detail the playing styles of the top tournament players. To begin with, we look at a Meijin league game by Kato Masao, indisputably the leading figure in the tournament scene over the last couple of years.

3rd Meijin League

White: Kato Masao, Honinbo & Judan

Black: Shiraishi Yutaka, 9-dan

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

date: 13th April, 1978





Figure 1 (1 - 22)

Figure 1 (1 - 22)

The first noteworthy point in this game is the Black 21-White 22 exchange. Black 21 is a solid move, building up strength as a springboard for attack. White 22 in response seems an ordinary enough move, but there is more to it than meets the eye. This move sparks off the first fighting of the game.

Before elaborating, let's take a closer look at the course of the game up to this point.

Black 9. Until fairly recently the usual move was at 1 or 'a' in Dia. 1, as the sequence from 9 to 14 used to be regarded as favourable for White. White gets secure territory, but Black's thickness with 9 to 13 is now regarded as adequate compensation, as it makes his pincer at 17 all the more severe. Note that Black will not make the pincer



at 1 or 'a' in Dia. 1.


With 10 and 12 White is giving Black a helpful push along the third line. He wants to make a one-space jump as soon as possible, but he cannot play 12 at 1 in Dia. 2, as Black can counter with 2 to 12. This result is terrible for White.

Dia. 3. Neither can White push through and cut with 1 and 3 in this position. Whatever happens after 8, Black will do well in the fighting.

Black 15 is necessary. If Black makes the pincer at 1 in Dia. 4 immediately, White will strike at 2. Black's five centre stones are cut adrift in the sequence to 14. (Refer 'Dictionary of Basic Joseki', I, p. 147)

The timing of 15 is important. If Black plays it before 9, that is, at 1 in Dia. 5, White can now safely jump to 6, thus economising on one of his third line moves.

Black 19 - the only move. Black 2 in Dia. 6 is wrong, as White 3 reverses the roles of attacker and defender. Since 3 is the key point, Black must play here to utilise the thickness he has built up at the bottom. Just one move can upset the



balance of power.

Figure 2 (20 – 39)

When White plays 20, you may be worried about the possibility of Black's using 21 to peep at 1 in Dia. 7. However, this would be premature. White connects at 2, then if Black 3 and 5, counters with the combination of 6 and 8. This is the worst result for Black. Instead of 7 –

Dia. 8. Black will cut at 1, but White is still able to squeeze with 6. In this position an interesting idea would be to attack the top right corner with 2 and 4. Even if Black captures at 5, White 6 still works well. This sequence would give White the initiative.

For the above reasons Black pulls back at 21 as preparation for making the peep. White must reinforce and he chooses the interesting move of 22.

It is safe to say that the sequence in Dia. 9






Figure 2 (20 – 39)




was in the back of the players' minds during the play up to this point. Dia. 9 is from the fourth game of the 2nd Meijin title match (White is Otake and Black is Rin – see GW6)

Dia. 9. White 1 and 3 are solid moves but they let Black secure territory. White 20 is a more interesting approach and 22 is an interesting follow-up. Quite possibly these moves occurred to Kato when he first went over the Rin – Otake game.


The sequence to 14 in Dia. 9 is worth savouring. Black 12 in response to White 11 is a slow but steady move which excited considerable comment at the time of the game. Black 37 in the Figure is of course at the same point, but we will come back to this later.

Black played 23 without giving much thought to it. White 24 next is at the vital point of this shape.


Black 25. Black is reluctant to connect at 1 in Dia. 10, as White can force with 2 to 6, creating a defect at 'a'. Black therefore naturally continues




Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

by making the hane at 25. The sequence to 35 follows, but Black is dissatisfied with this result, as White is left with 1 in Dia. 11. The sequence here is White's privilege, but all the same he has to be careful about when he plays it. Before Black connects at 4 —

Dia. 12. He can first try attaching at 4 here. White must play 5, whereupon Black defends with 6. Black now has some potential for launching a severe attack on the centre white group with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.

After the game Kato suggested that if Black was unhappy with the result to 35, perhaps he could have tried Black 1 in Dia. 13 instead. Shiraishi apparently could not decide during the game whether or not this approach was better. In any case playing 22 seems to have been worthwhile. This move is a good example of Kato's flexibility and skill at fighting.

Shiraishi regretted his move at 37 — Black already has a solid position here, so this stone is over-concentrated. Black 37 occupies the same point as 12 in Dia. 9, but the difference is that the latter move was played in response to White's approach move at 11, whereas Black 37 in the Figure is far too leisurely. White is delighted with the exchange of 37 for 38, so Black should have omitted 37 and played immediately at 39 at the top.

Figure 3 (40 — 65)

Playing 42 the instant Black plays 41 shows exquisite timing. The obvious response to 42 is 1 and 3 in Dia. 14, but then the merit of 42 be-






Figure 3 (40 — 65)

comes clear: since Black ● (41) is not at 'a', White is left with the invasion point at 'b', so Black is dissatisfied. Not that one can call Black 41 a bad move, however — rather, one must praise White 42.

Ishida Yoshio 9-dan commented that Black 43 was the losing move. Black 43 aims first and foremost at attacking White, but actually Black has no choice but to follow Dia. 14.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Ishida also commented that Black should have followed Dia. 15 with 45. Black 1 takes sente, so Black can defend at 3. Presumably, however, Shiraishi could not bear to let White secure his group with 2 — rather he staked the game upon attacking this white group.


White 56 and 58 took Shiraishi completely by surprise. Playing 59 at 1 in Dia. 16 is out of the question, as White is happy to play 2 and 4.

Figure 4 (66 — 85)


With 66 White lives comfortably inside Black's



Kato Masao



Dia. 16



Dia. 17




Figure 4 (66 - 85)

territory, so he is satisfied, but actually he has let slip a chance to wrap up the game. When Black plays 67, White's centre group is still being threatened and as long as this group is unsettled, White cannot be sure of winning. Instead of 66 —

Dia. 17. If White plays 1 to 9 here, there is no way for Black to live. Black is left with the end-game sequence of Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', but still this result would put White ahead even without the komi.

Why did White slack off with 66? Perhaps he was so pleased with his result here that he did not bother to analyse more deeply. Or perhaps he felt that there might be some risk involved in attempting to capture Black.

Black 77 is important. If Black plays at 79 immediately, White easily settles himself with 'a'.

Black finally succeeds in complicating the position with 79. Black's ● stone, which initially was out of focus, is now being utilised in an attack. To this extent one can say that Black has made a recovery.

Black 81 is natural but is also a shrewd move. If White defends, Black should be able to get a fair-sized territory at the top.

Incidentally, it is worth noting that at this stage Black can only consider attacking moves. Playing 79 at 'b', for example, would probably leave him behind on the board. Black's only chance of winning is to complicate the position as much as possible.

Playing 79 at 'b' would give Black forty points at most at the top. Even after White 82 and 84, Black can still expect to get thirty points. At this stage a ten-point move is not big.

Black 85. Black is still aiming at the centre white group.



Shiraishi Yutaka




Figure 5 (86 - 100)

Figure 5 (86 - 100)


Black 95. At this stage Black still has not given up hope of winning, though he will have to play vigorously to overhaul White.

White 96 defends against the threat of a black attack at 'a'.

Black 97 is a turning point of the middle game. Ishida suggested playing Black 1 before 3 in Dia. 18 and gave the continuation to 11, with the comment that this would make the game even. He hypothesised the continuation to 21, but there is no guarantee that the game would go so well for Black. For instance, White might play 4 one space to the left of 17, leaving Black with a weakness in the corner to be exploited later on.


A more pertinent question, perhaps, is what would have happened if Black had played 97 at 'b'.

In the game Black is trying to take advantage



Dia. 18

of White's defensive psychology in defending at 96. If White gets to play at 97, Black would fall way behind in territory and his only remaining chance would be to make an all-out attack on White's centre group. Playing at 'b' with 97 would require courage on Black's part, though White would also feel apprehensive. If Kato had been playing Black, he might have chosen the solid move of 'b'. In any case, this is a subtle strategic problem.



Dia. 19

The combination of 98 and 100 is a standard tesuji. Dia. 19 shows a handicap game joseki, but this is not good enough in an even game, as White gets very nice shape with 2 and 4.




Figure 6 (101 - 150)

With 10 White further reinforces this group. He is sure that he can win even if he permits Black to connect at 11. Although the final margin was quite small, both the players felt that the game was decided after White played this move. The extra 130 moves played after this did not change anything. The instability of this group had been White's only source of concern during the middle game.

Figure 7 (151 - 200), Figure 8 (201 - 240)

Looking back on this game, the decisive turning points were Kato's peeps at 22 and 42. These moves are good examples of his ability to seize the initiative and control the flow of the game. Once Black went wrong with 43, he had no real chance to take away the lead from White,




Figure 7 (151 – 200)

though he did manage to complicate the issue a little.

Kato is also known for his skill at making efficient use of his time. The move he thought most deeply about was White 80 in Figure 4. Having built up a lead, he probably wanted to




Figure 8 (201 – 240)

White wins and connects the ko.

make absolutely sure that his large group could look after itself. This cautiousness is undoubtedly an important factor in his success in tournament play.

White wins by 1½ points. ('Gekkan Gogaku', Jan. '79)

3rd Meijin League Playoff

There was an exciting finish to the 1978 Meijin league, with Otake just managing to catch up to Kato in the home stretch. The two tied for first place with 7–1 scores and so a playoff was held to decide the challenger to Rin Kaiho. The players in the Meijin league are ranked according to their results in the previous league and formerly the higher ranked player took precedence in the case of a tie. This rule was revised in 1977 to allow for a playoff between the top two ranked players in a tie (bad luck for lower ranked players in a multiple tie). This system has also been adopted by the Honinbo league which previously followed the fairer system of letting all players tied for first participate in the playoff. The frequency of multiple ties (five tying for first one year in the Honinbo league out of eight players) makes this system too troublesome – it can be like replaying the league – so the present compromise in the Meijin and Honinbo leagues is perhaps unavoidable. In any case, this game between Otake and Kato is the first application of the new rule.

White: Otake Hideo 9-dan

Black: Kato Masao, Honinbo & Judan

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each




Figure 1 (1 – 22)

date: 26th August, 1978

Figure 1 (1 – 22).

Black 9. Playing at 'a' (or 10), making miai of extensions at the top centre and the bottom centre, is preferable, according to Otake. White is happy with his fuseki development up to 18. When Black splits up the left side with 19 and 21, White 22 works nicely to expand White's moyo at the bottom.




Figure 2 (23 - 70)

ko: 46, 49; 51: connects

Figure 2 (23 - 70)

Black 29. White 29 would be a severe attack.

White 36 is an excellent point. White's strategy is to let Black take the right side, as he has enough territory at the bottom to compensate, provided that he can settle his invading group at the top.

Black 51. Black seems to have little choice, as he has no good ko threats after 47.

White 54 makes miai of 'a' and 56. Black 55 is necessary to forestall White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', after which Black cannot save 37.

The cut at 56 works well for White, enabling him to counterattack as he leads his group out. White 70 is an overplay, however — simply joining up his groups with White 'f'—Black 'g'—White 'h' is good enough.

Figure 3 (71 - 100)

Forcing with 72 and 74 does not compensate for the strength that Black gains by making a pon-nuki. This exchange is uncharacteristic of Otake.

Kato does not miss this opportunity. First he exchanges 77 for 78 to reinforce his centre group (though provoking 78 is a minus for Black), then he creates some aji in the bottom left corner with 79 and 81, after which he attacks White's centre group with 85. This may be his chance to take the lead.

White 94. Connecting with 'a' would be safer. However, Otake feels that this will be the decisive stage of the game, so he plays all out with 94.




Figure 3 (71 - 100)

Black could cut off the white group, but killing it will not be easy. He therefore creates a diversion with 95, hoping to be able to exploit the threat of cutting.





Figure 4 (101 - 150)

ko: 47, 50


Figure 4 (101 - 150)

Black 1. Black slips up here, as making a hane at 1 in Dia. 1 would put White on the spot. If White 2, Black can play 3 and 5, making miai of 'a' and 'b'. White 'a' lets Black move out at 'b', but if White plays 'b', Black can push through and cut with 'a', White 'c', Black 'd'.

Dia. 2. White therefore has to answer 1 at 2, but then Black lives easily with the forced sequence to 14.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Black does reduce White's bottom area in sente up to 5, but this result is not good enough.

Black 7 – 17. This profit was guaranteed to Black by the earlier exchange here.

Black 19. Black 22 would be 'usual', but this is gote.

Black 27, 29. The losing moves, in the opinion of some players, though actually Black has been trailing throughout. Apparently pushing up with 1 in Dia. 3 (Ishida gives the continuation to 13) would give Black a better chance of staying in the game.

White 32 wraps up the game for Otake (if Black 36, White gets a geta with 'a').





Figure 6 (201 – 242)



Dia. 3

Figure 5 (151 – 200), Figure 6 (201 – 242)

White 2 in Figure 6 is a declaration of victory: it makes miai of 9 (6 points) and 10 (5½ points).

The game ended at 5.25 p.m. Both Otake and Kato had played with surprising speed for such an important game.

Otake's long months of patience had finally paid off. After losing to Kato in the third round, in February, he had to wait until the seventh round, in late July, for someone else to slow Kato down enough for him to catch him. Once he got the chance of a playoff, Otake made no mistake.

White wins by 3½ points.

Time taken. White: 2 hours 52 minutes

Black: 3 hours 40 minutes

(From commentaries by Ishida 9-dan and Yamabe 9-dan)




Figure 5 (151 – 200)

55: connects

Third Meijin Title

The main interest of the 1978 Meijin title was whether Otake would avenge his humiliating 0 – 4 defeat by Rin Kaiho last year. Surprisingly enough, Otake was regarded by many as the favourite this time. The reason was that Rin had been in so-so form before the title match (16 wins, 12 losses), whereas Otake had been playing magnificently. He had just succeeded in wresting the Gosei title from Kato, while his win in the Meijin league playoff made his record 27 wins to 7 losses. Even the usually confident Rin voiced the apprehension that ‘this time I might get done’.

Game One

White: Otake Hideo, Gosei

Black: Rin Kaiho, Meijin

komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

date: 7th, 8th September, 1978

played at the Hanezawa Garden, Shibuya, Tokyo




Figure 1 (1 – 40)

Figure 1 (1 – 40)

White 8, an invention of Kitani Minoru, is a very leisurely pincer.

Black 11, instead of the standard ‘a’ or ‘b’, has become popular recently.


Black 23. Black wants to start a fight in order to frustrate White’s strategy of playing a leisurely game.

White 34. If at 35, Black will attack at ‘c’.

White 36. Necessary to prevent Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 1.

Black 37, guarding against White ‘d’, makes excellent shape.

Black 39 is correct. Black 1 in Dia. 2 would be bad style, as White can spoil Black’s shape with 2 and 4.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

White 40 is a surprising move. White threatens to cross underneath, thus helping his group on the centre left. However, playing on the 2nd line is too small at this stage of the game and causes White to fall behind. White should move out with ‘e’ or attack Black with ‘f’ (omitting 38).




Figure 2 (41 – 63)

Figure 2 (41 – 63)

Black naturally ignores 40 and defends at 41. He is also happy to exchange 43 for 42.

White 48 seems petty, but permitting Black ‘a’ – White ‘b’ – Black 48 would be painful.

Black 53 is a cautious attacking move. Black is not sure how to attack the two white stones, so he chooses the safe way with 53, expanding his cor-

ner area while attacking. White, however, decides that he cannot afford to worry about these two stones — he is so far behind that he must do something dramatic. Black's only weakness is at the bottom, so White attacks with 54.

Black 63. The sealed move at the end of the first day. Rin had originally intended to play Black 'c'—White 'd'—Black 'e', but then White has a useful move at 'f' which gives some help to the two stones above. After thinking for seventy-five minutes, Rin decided to declare war with 63.




Figure 3 (64 - 94)


Figure 3 (64 - 94)

White 68. There seems to be no way of killing Black's group. If White attacks with 1 to 5 in Dia. 3, Black counters with the peep at 6. If White 7, Black crosses underneath with 8.

Dia. 4. If White plays 1 instead of 7 in Dia. 3, he collapses in the sequence to 10.


Black 69. Black can easily live by giving up two stones with the sequence in Dia. 5. However, at this stage he intends to sacrifice the corner.

Black 79. Rin changes his mind. His original plan was to follow Dia. 6. This lets White capture Black's corner group with 6 and 8, but Black takes compensation at the top by pushing through with




Dia. 3


Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 7



Dia. 6

9 to 13. Since White has no eyes, he will have to take the corner black group off the board, so Black gains profit by squeezing him in the centre (if White lets Black play at 'a' after 17, White would just win the capturing race by one move).

The corner is insignificant, compared to Black's gain in the centre, so this would have settled the game at one stroke. Rin read out this sequence (and it held good in the post-game analysis), but he then became worried about the riskiness of giving White certain profit in advance. Embarking upon this kind of ambitious operation in an important game requires courage.

Scrambling for life with 83 and 85 gives White useful forcing moves at 84 and 86 for building his own eye-shape, but Black remains safely in the lead.

White 92. White can live in the corner by playing at 1 in Dia. 7. The placement at 2 does not work, as White kills Black first with 3 to 9. Since White is behind, however, he has to resort to emergency measures, so he decides to give up the corner in exchange for successive moves in the centre. Once Black plays 93, he can kill White with 2 in Dia. 7, so he picks up nearly forty points here. In exchange, White strengthens all his stones around the centre with 92 and 94, but

the capture of Black's stones on the left is by no means guaranteed.




Figure 4 (95 - 143)

132: connects

Figure 4 (95 - 143)

White 96. 'A fatal mistake', in Otake's words. White must play 1 and 3 in Dia. 7, after which he can live in sente with 5 and 9, then capture the black group with 11. If Black 12, White makes one forcing move at 13, after which the game will be decided by how much of a dent White can make in Black's top right corner.

Otake was upset to see Rin take the vital point of 97. White can still capture Black by playing at 117, but White can no longer live in sente (Black does not have to answer 108 in the Figure). White therefore switches to 98, threatening to cut at 114 - above all, White must try to complicate the position. However, even if Black loses his group on the left, he has already received sufficient compensation.

Black 117 is a bold move, as playing safe with 126 would be good enough to win. White's only

hope is to try and kill the lot.

Black 125 is the first step in a clever rescue operation. This move sets up a squeeze which reduces White's liberties.

Black 135 secures life for the group. If White plays 136 at 141, then after Black 'a', White 'b', Black plays at 'c', securing another eye because of White's shortage of liberties.

Black 143. Making a second eye with 'a' would be safer, but Black is confident that he can rescue his centre stones as well.




Figure 5 (144 - 193)

Figure 5 (144 - 193)

Even after Black 47, White can get a ko on the side by throwing in at 1 in Dia. 8, but it will be Black's turn to take the ko. Since Black can kill the corner white group with one more move after 2, White could not hope to win this ko.

In the end White gets no compensation for the group he gave up in the bottom right corner, so his position is hopeless. White has one last fling at the top, just for form's sake, but he does not seriously expect it to lead to anything.


This was a disappointing start to the series for Otake. Much of the blame for his defeat must go to his over-deliberate fuseki strategy.

Black wins by resignation after 193.


Time taken. White: 6 hours 43 minutes

Black: 8 hours 56 minutes

(Adapted from commentaries by Rin Kaiho)



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Game Two

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Otake Hideo

date: 20th, 21st September, 1978

played at Takarazuka City





Figure 1 (1 – 35)

Figure 1 (1 – 35). *Rin's large moyo strategy*


Black 9. The sequence Black 'a', White 9, Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd' is another possibility.

White 16. Black is hoping for White 18 – Black 'e', so countering with a pincer is natural.


Black 25 is a move invented by Fujisawa Hosai. The usual move is blocking at 1 in Dia. 1,



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

which lets White build up his moyo by pressing at 2. Black could simply answer 4 at 7 (White still connects at 6), but if he starts a fight with 5 and 9, White's thickness at the top should prove useful.

White 28 – 34. This large moyo strategy is most unusual for Rin. Of course, Black bears much of the responsibility, as he could have nipped it in the bud by attaching at 'f' with 17. Perhaps Otake wanted to make Rin play a strategy he was not used to.




Figure 2 (36 – 53)

Figure 2 (36 – 53). *Black's missed opportunity*

Black 39. Otake very much regretted this move and other professionals did not think much of it either. White gets excellent shape with 40 and 42 and considerably strengthens his moyo. Instead of 39 –

Dia. 2. This is Black's chance to play a probe at 1. If White 2, Black should be able to settle himself with the sequence to 11.

Dia. 3. If White counters with 2, Black plays 3 and 5, then cuts at 7. White 'a', permitting Black 'b' would be painful, so White would probably continue with 8 and 10, but Black seems safe after 11. Black could also crosscut at 'c' with 3, again aiming at the cutting point at 7.

Once White has played 40 and 42, Black 1 in Dias. 2 and 3 does not work as well, though it would still be possible.

Black 43. The proper move (*honte*) is 'a', but Black has to attack as White ignored 39. White 44 and 52 are standard moves for settling one's stones.





Figure 3 (54 – 81)

Figure 3 (54 – 81). Complications

Black 55. Black would like to crawl at 1 in Dia. 4, but White can counter with 2 and 4. After Black 5, White plays the sequence to 14, capturing two stones in sente (if instead of 13 Black captures 12, he will lose the whole group) and getting a favourable result.



Dia. 4

White 60. Cutting to the left of 61 would be more disagreeable for Black.


White 62 is a strong fighting move – White could live immediately with White 63, Black 62, White 'a', Black connects, White 'b', but White does not want to permit Black 62. However, White 62 leads to some very difficult fighting.

White 70 is another determined move: when Black plays 71, the game reaches a crisis point. White has no choice but to push up and cut with 72 and 74. Note that Black 75 next is the vital point.


Black 79 is a slack move – this should be at 1 in Dia. 5. White cannot attack with 2 and 4, as Black has a clever counter with 5 and 7. If next White 'a' (White 'c' would be suicidal), Black squeezes with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', then captures a stone with Black 'e'. This result is terrible

for White, so he would of course play 80 in the Figure instead of 2. However, Black could then defend with 'c' in the Figure, getting much better shape than he does with 79 and 81.

Black 81. The sealed move on the first day.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Figure 4 (82 – 109)

Figure 4 (82 – 109). White in the lead

White 82. White decides to sacrifice his group at the bottom. He gets ample compensation in the centre in the sequence to 90.

Black 91 is necessary to complete the capture of this group, as White threatens to play 1 and 3 in Dia. 6. Having to play a ko at 'a' would be terrible for Black.

White gets a superb moyo in the centre with 92 to 96 and is clearly in the lead. Perhaps Black should have invaded at 97 or 98 instead of answering 94 at 95.

Black 97. As far as Black can safely go.

White 100. If at 101, Black plays 102 and White cannot be sure of killing him.

Black 109. Black 'a' is the safe move but this would not be enough.




Figure 5 (110 - 160)


ko: 26, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49, 52, 55, 58

Figure 5 (110 - 160). White slips up in the corner.


White 14. White is aiming at a ko with this move, but actually he missed an easy way to live here. Instead of 14, he should make the contact play at 1 in Dia. 7. If Black 2, White lives with 3 and 5, while if Black plays 2 at 'a', White exchanges 2 for Black 'b', then again lives with 3 and 5. Naturally the game would have been over if Rin had noticed this sequence.

White 18. White misses another chance to get unconditional life in the corner, though this time the sequence is much more complicated.


Dia. 8. If White connects at 1, Black must



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

hane at 2, but then White has a clever cut at 3. If Black 4, White just keeps extending with 5 etc. He will be quite happy to connect up with 11, but if Black tries to capture him by playing 10 at 11, then White plays the sequence White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. A throw-in by White at 'e' then secures the capture of some of Black's stones.


Dia. 9. The only other possibility is for Black to give atari at 4, but then White lives with the brilliant sequence to 19.

Both Rin and Otake overlooked the sequences in Dias. 8 and 9. These were actually discovered by Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan, who has a reputation second to none for ability to analyse tricky corner positions.


Rin's careless play in this corner could perhaps be excused by the fact that even a ko is a perfectly adequate result for him. Unfortunately, however, he also slipped up in his handling of the ko threats.

White 30. This answer, trying to make pure profit out of capturing 27, is a little greedy. The drawback of 30 is that it lets Black get an unlimited number of ko threats on the left side. The solid answer at 1 in Dia. 10 would have been much better. Even if White loses the ko, he gets enough compensation to win with 3 and 5.

White 56. Rin also regretted this ko threat, as White 1 in Dia. 11 works much better. Black cannot afford to give up any points here, so he will counter with 2 and 4, but he seems to have no answer to 7.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

After the game Rin described 56 as the losing move. The reason becomes apparent in the next figure.

Figure 6 (161 – 200). *Otake stages an upset.*

When White plays 62, Black counterattacks with 63 and White has no good answer. This is why Rin regretted playing White 56.

Rin finally dissolved the ko with 70, whereupon Otake lived with 71. Rin could have kept on fighting the ko, but he was already in time trouble and the position was just too difficult to work out all the complications. The source of White's troubles was the way he answered Black's ko threats, especially his greedy move at 30 in Figure 5.





Figure 6 (161 – 200)
ko: 68

The exchange of the top right corner for the left side is favourable for Black and gives him the lead in the game. Rin's strategy has been upset – it was only necessary for him to use the ko in the top right corner to gain a few points of profit elsewhere, yet he has ended up living there, while in exchange Black has lived inside White's moyo. In addition, Black has gained by poking his head through at 63. White is of course going to make an attempt to kill all of Black's stones at the top right but with little real prospect of success.

Black 73. Otake commented that capturing White's three stones with Black 74 would have been simpler. Black could then still get a ko on the left with White 73, Black 'a', and Black has more ko threats.



Dia. 12

Black 87. The last incident of the game – This is a very careless move which could have thrown away Black's win. Black 87 should be at 89, as White could kill the group by playing 92 at 96.

Dia. 12. Black cannot get a second eye for his group. If he had omitted the ▲△ exchange, however, he could make his second eye by giving atari at △.




Figure 7 (201 – 263)

ko: 37,42,63; Black wins and connects the ko

Figure 7 (201 – 263). *A gruelling game*

Black 5 is another slip, though irrelevant to the outcome. Black 5 at 7 would gain two points, as White 6 would not be sente.

This was a long and tiring game. Otake commented that he and Rin had 'played enough Go for two games'. The moves up to about 102 made up the first game, which was clearly won by Rin. Thereafter, it was as if a second game began and in this one Rin went to pieces, partly through taking unnecessary risks, partly because of inadequate analysis complicated by time

trouble. However, this win for Otake was the best result for Go fans, as it put a stop to his disastrous series of losses to Rin and evened the series.

Black wins by 2½ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 56 minutes

Black: 5 hours 12 minutes

(Based on a joint commentary by Otake, Yamabe and Ishigure in the November 1978 'Kido')

Game Three

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Rin Kaiho

date: 5th, 6th October, 1978

played at Izu




Figure 1 (1 – 34)

Figure 1 (1 – 34). Otake's bold beginning


Black 1, 3, 5. The Shusaku fuseki, a little unusual these days.

Black 15. The exchange for 16 helps White, but Black uses his thickness here to make the severe pincer at 17.


Black 19 is quite unusual. The standard move is Black 20.

White 20. Otake thought about this move for eighty-nine minutes. The exchange for 21 is bad for White, but White 20 acts as a ladder-block, thus making the strong move of 22 possible. After 22, the sequence to 38 in Figure 2 is probably inevitable. For Black to crawl along the third line with 1 in Dia. 1 instead of 23 would be painfully submissive. After 6, Black would have to seek life on the edge.

White 32. If White gives atari at 34 first, then after Black 28—White 32, Black can play 'a'.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 2 (35 – 65)

Figure 2 (35 – 65). White is satisfied.

Black 35. If at 37, White can wedge in at 39.

White 36 and 38 are standard moves for settling a group. Otake read this far when considering 20.

Black 39 is a surprising move. This solid connection seems slow, though it does set up Black 41 next. Otake commented that if he were Black, he would prefer to play 1 and 3 in Dia. 2. The continuation to 9 is one possibility.

The result to 41 gives Black profit and White influence. Black's subsequent aim is to hane out at 'a', while White will aim at playing in at 'b'. In terms of the overall position, White can be satisfied with settling his group on the side in sente.

Black 43. If at 44, White will play 'c'.

The sequence to 65 is a standard small avalanche joseki, though the book gives 65 at 'd' (see 'Dictionary of Basic Joseki', vol. 2, p. 31).





Figure 3 (66 - 100)
90: connects

Figure 3 (66 - 100). *A magnificent sacrifice strategy*

White 66 is necessary to prevent Black from sealing him in. When Rin played 67, it looked as if he had recovered from his slightly unfavourable beginning. However, Otake countered with a superb manoeuvre which demonstrated a profound appreciation of the overall position.

White 68. Otake decides to sacrifice his three stones at the bottom. White could of course live by playing 1 in Dia. 3, but Black would be happy to push along on top with 2 etc. Black could continue by attacking the group on the left with 12 and could also aim at Black 'a'. Living with his group would thus put White on the road to defeat.

White 70. The sealed move on the first day. White builds thickness with the forcing moves of



Dia. 3

70 and 72 (White 'a' is also sente) preparatory to attacking with 74 etc. White hopes to use this attack to gain compensation at the top for what he has given up at the bottom. At this stage White's prospects of winning look good.


Black 81. The game will be decided by how much Black can reduce White's top area.

Black 87. If at 1 in Dia. 4, White should be able to kill him with 2 to 6.


White 92 is necessary to deprive Black of eye-shape. If at 'b', Black gets a resilient shape with Black 92, White 'c', Black 'd'.

Black's group is more or less settled after 93 and 95, so White switches to attacking the other group with 96. White has firmly gripped the initiative.

Black 99. Black could defend his cutting point with Black 'e', White 'f', Black 99, but he will have trouble settling his group after White attacks with 'g'.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Figure 4 (101 - 138). *Otake's only slip*

White 4. White is not afraid of the ko if Black cuts at 'a'.

Black 9. If at 1 in Dia. 5, Black can keep sente with 5, as 'a' is not necessary. However, there are disadvantages, as Black loses the ko potential here since the atari of Black 'd' after the Black 'b' - White 'c' exchange disappears. Black also loses the peep of 'e', which makes a big difference to the endgame.

Black 11 defends against White 'b'. Black is flat out looking after both of his groups at the same time.

White 18. Otake's only bad move of the game. According to Otake, capturing the top is small, since reinforcing in the centre with 21 to 25 just about makes the game favourable for Black. Instead of 18, White should have attacked with




Figure 4 (101 - 138)

ko: 14, 17, 22; 24: connects

White 21, Black 'c', White 'd'. White would be unlikely to lose the ko around 'a', while he could also aim at White A. In addition, Black 29 would no longer be a threat.

White 22. White should still fight by blocking at 23. Black 25, White 'e', Black 'f' would probably follow, after which White could aim at attaching at 'g'.

Black 27 is a mistake. Rin was once again suffering from time trouble and so did not have the composure to work out the best sequence. He was most upset to see Otake play 28 and thereafter tried desperately to prevent 27 from becoming an outright loss (*mochikomi*). His efforts to set up a ko were unnecessary, for if he had played coolly after 28 he could still have won.


Black 31. If instead Black 32, White 'h', Black 31, White kills him with 'i'. Rin's preoccupation with the top cost him his chance of winning. Instead of 31 —

Dia. 6. Black 1, giving up the stones at the top and forestalling White 'a', is best. After 2, Black can play the same sequence to 10 that appears in the game, then attack White with 13 (if 13 at 'b', White lives with 13). After taking profit from attacking this group, Black can come back to link up his centre group. This would give him a slight lead.

Black loses points by provoking 32 and 34. What is more, he cannot hope to win the ko anyway.

Figure 5 (139 - 180). Otake wraps it up.

Black 47. A reinforcement is necessary but 'a'



Dia. 6




Figure 5 (139 - 180)

ko: 58, 61, 64; 69: takes 68; 70: atari (two spaces left of 68); ko: 72, 75

is better.

After 66 a new ko begins on the bottom right, but White's group has a very flexible shape.

Black 71. If at 68 in an attempt to reduce White to one large eye (*hana-roku* or 'flowery six'), White gets a second eye with 'b'.

White has any number of ko threats, so Black finally throws in the towel, after first setting the scene for resignation with 77 and 79.

The only flaw in Otake's play in this game was his unthinking move at 18 in Figure 4, but this was more than redeemed by his skilful play in settling his group in the beginning and his boldly-conceived sacrifice strategy in the middle game. Other leading professionals have agreed in

calling this game one of the masterpieces of Otake's career.

White wins by resignation after 180.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 15 minutes

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes

(Adapted from commentaries by Otake and Kato in the December, 1978 issues of 'Kido' and 'Igo Club' respectively)

Game Four

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Otake Hideo

date: 11th, 12th October, 1978

played at Futsuka City, Fukuoka prefecture




Figure 1 (1 - 35)

Figure 1 (1 - 35). *White goes for territory.*

White 14. According to Ishida Yoshio 9-dan, the sequence White 15-Black 'a'-White 'b' would be more usual. This would make miai of a move at the bottom or on the right next.

Black 27, defending the weak point of 'c', is a good counter to the peep. White is forced into a heavy shape with 28.

White 32, 34. Rin regretted these territory-oriented moves, as Otake was able to launch a severe attack with 35. Instead of 32, White should play at 35 himself. Black 'd' and White 'e' would probably follow, leading to the leisurely development which above all should be White's aim in a komi game. Note that White 35 would set up a placement at 'f', which would help to settle White's group if it later came under attack.

Figure 2 (36 - 65). *Tactical give and take*

White 40, 42. This combination is a bit of an




Figure 2 (36 - 65)

overplay. Simpler would be White 'a', Black 40, White 42.

Black 43. Black misses his chance. He should hane at 1 in Dia. 1, as he gets useful thickness in the sequence to 13. Otake meant to play this way but assumed that White would answer 'a' at 'b'.

White 44 is a smart counterattack aimed at taking sente.

Black 45. If at 46, White connects underneath with White 'b', Black 45, White 'c'.

Black 47. If at 51, White gets a forcing move at 'd'.

The sequence to 55 is thus forced, so White gets sente to play 56 and 58. Black's consolation is that he can now get eye-shape at any time with 'e', so he can fight strongly in the centre.

Black 59 and 61 are clever moves. If White plays 62 at 'f', Black forces with 'g', then hanes beneath 'f', whereupon 61 is seen to be right at the vital point. White thus has no choice but to switch to 62 in the centre.

Figure 3 (66 - 100). *Problems in the corner*

White 66. The game becomes a competition in reducing the opponent's territory. Black could have made it a competition in building territory by playing 65 one space to the left of 66, but he could not be certain of winning this way. Reducing territory is safer. In addition, with 67 to 73 Black is preparing the way for an attack on the centre white group.

White 74. If at 75, Black attacks with 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', creating two cutting points. White 74 defends against this attack.






Figure 3 (66 – 100)

White 76 and 78 are inconsistent. For a start, it is questionable whether 76 can be called a forcing move, but once White has played it, he should follow it up with 1 in Dia. 2. If Black 2, White can lightly dodge to 3. Once White defends against 2 with 78, it becomes easy for Black to attach at 85 in the figure, as it does not destroy any aji.

Black 79 – 83. Black figures that this exchange will be of some help in the centre.

Black 85 works perfectly. If White makes the usual answer at 87, Black exchanges 'd' for White 'e', then switches to 99.

White has no answer to Black 87. Rin apparently expected Black to play 1 in Dia. 3, whereupon he intended to play the sequence to 8, giving




up two stones but getting satisfactory shape. However, when Black plays 87 –

Dia. 4. The same approach gives White greatly inferior shape. Rin commented that when he saw 87, he felt like giving up and going home.

Nonetheless, White offers the strongest resistance, taking sente with 88 to 92, then attaching at 94. This leaves him with various weaknesses in the corner, however. Black's main problem is deciding just what to do there: if he opts for one sequence, he loses another. For example –

Dia. 5. Black can pick up three stones with 1 to 9 but in gote.



Dia. 6. A more high-level approach is to attack White's eye-shape with 1. When White counters by attaching at 6, Black gives up his stones, letting White live on a large scale but getting in return a ponnuki at 11. Since Black 'a' is also sente, Black builds useful thickness for attacking White's centre group.

In view of the manifold possibilities here, Black's best plan is to wait until the overall position has been clarified sufficiently for him to decide on his strategy.

Black 97 is a tough move. Black 98 would be more peaceful. White 97, Black 'f', White 'g', Black 100, White 'h', Black 'i' would follow. This would leave Black slightly in the lead. Otake does not like simply surrounding territory, however; he prefers to pick up points in the cut and thrust of the infighting.





Figure 4 (101 - 124)

Figure 4 (101 - 124). Rin's aberration


White 12. The sealed move. It is very unusual for over a hundred moves to be played on the first day of a two-day game. Rin, who had used 4 hours 14 minutes to Otake's 3 hours 28 minutes, must have been determined to avoid getting into time trouble again. He spent twenty-four minutes on 12, but it was not the best - White 21 was preferable.

White 14 - 18. White goes right off the rails here, as this exchange only helps Black to build thickness with 19. Instead of 14, White should play 1 in Dia. 7. This would give him sente, so he could make two eyes with 5.


White 24. The losing move. White could live by playing 1 in Dia. 8. Black 2 is necessary to prevent White 'a', so White gets unconditional life with 5 and 7. Rin would still have been in the




Dia. 7




Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

game if this group had lived, but apparently he got so upset with his hallucination with 14 to 18 that he lost all fighting spirit. This is not characteristic of Rin, for usually he plugs on tenaciously regardless of any setbacks.




Figure 5 (125 - 159)

Figure 5 (125 - 159). The coup de grace

White cannot get two eyes after Black 25, though he could set up a ko with 28 at 1 in Dia. 9. White 'a' is sente against the four black stones to the left, so Black cannot connect to the left of 2 after White 3. However, this would be a one-sided ko in Black's favour, while White would have to add a move to make it a real ko for him. In Ishida's words, White would be 'better off dead'. Since he does have plenty of liberties,


White decides to try to set up a capturing race (semeai) with the black group.

White 34 protects the corner but it is weakened again by Black 47. In an emergency, Black has the trump card of the ko shown in Dia. 10, but he wants to capture the white group unconditionally.

White 52. If at 1 in Dia. 11, Black counters with 2 to 6. Black 12 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.

Black 59 finally puts White out of his misery.

Dia. 12. White cannot hane at 4, so he must block at 1. The sequence to 8 (6 at 8 is the same thing) makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.



Note that the timing of 57 is important.

Dia. 13. If Black plays 1 to 7 first, White has the clever combination of 8 and 10, taking away Black's eye in sente (after 12 Black must defend against White 'a' followed by White 'b').

This was the most one-sided game so far. Otake seized the initiative early and held on to it throughout. Black 85 in Figure 3 was perhaps the decisive blow. The defect created in White's corner plagued him for the rest of the game and finally caused his whole position to collapse in ruins.

Black wins by resignation after 159.

Time taken. White: 6 hours 6 minutes

Black: 5 hours 27 minutes

(Adapted from commentaries by Otake and Ishida in the December 1978 'Kido' and 'Igo Club' respectively)

Game Five

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Rin Kaiho

date: 23rd, 24th October, 1978

played at Kawaramachi, Yugawara

Figure 1 (1 – 22). *Point of no return*

The flow of the 1977 Meijin title had been completely reversed in this series – Otake had overwhelmed Rin with three wins in a row and





Figure 1 (1 – 22)

the latter now faced the first of three kadobans. Would he be able to stage the kind of miraculous recovery for which he is so famous?

Black 17. The sequence Black 'a'–White 'b'–Black 'c' is also a joseki, but the thickness built by 'b' would help White in attacking the three black stones at the top.

White 18. If at 'a', Black intends to jump to 'd', if then White 'e', Black would make shape with 22.

White 16 – 20. A unified strategy, though perhaps 18 and 20 were overplays, according to Otake. More usual would be playing 16 at 1 in Dia. 1. After the joseki to 9, Black would switch to 'f' in the figure.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Rin: 'If White played 1 in Dia. 2, I intended to hane at 2, then enclose the side with 4. If White then played inside at 5, I would have resisted with 6. Black gets considerable thickness by connecting underneath up to 14.'

White 20. A subtle point. If White pulled back at 1 in Dia. 3 (next page), Black would switch to 2 on the left, letting White cut at 5. Since White 1 makes inefficient shape (it should be at 'a'), Black is prepared to sacrifice his stone.

Black 21. Once White plays 20, Black cannot permit him to cut at 21.



Dia. 3




Figure 2 (23 – 55)


Figure 2 (23 – 55). The losing move?

White bases his opening strategy upon making a severe attack upon Black's stones on the left, but he pays a price. The White 18–Black 21 and White 24–Black 27 exchanges are unfavourable for White.


Black 29. If Black 'a', White can aim at playing 'b' later.

Black 35. Black could also simply connect at 1 in Dia. 4, whereupon the moves to 5 would be likely. However, Rin was concerned that Otake might instead follow Dia. 5, which would start a difficult fight.

White 40. Rin expected White 44–Black 45, after which the continuation White 'c'–Black 'd'–White 53 would be reasonable. This would give White a slightly better position than he gets in



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

the game.


White 42. White 1 in Dia. 6 gives White a bad result. The sequence to 45 is thus forced.

White 46 seems small but if omitted White has to answer Black 'e' at 'f', which is painfully submissive.


The result to 47 is favourable for Black – his stones are working more efficiently than White's.

Black 49. The only move. If at 50, White is happy to invade at the 3–3 point.

Black 51, 53. Rin regretted making this attack. Playing immediately at 55 is better.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

White 54. In Rin's opinion, this might well be the losing move. Takagawa 9-dan, the official referee for this game, comments that he felt the same the moment he saw White 54. White must move into Black's territory with 1 in Dia. 7. Black 2 is forced, so White can then move out with 3. Black will next play 4 to defend against the threat of White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c'. If White 5, Black 6 is forced, so White can also exchange 7 for 8. The endgame sequence White 'd'–Black 'e'–White 'f' could be expected later. All in all, this makes a difference of twenty points to the top area.

Black 55. Black promptly seizes his second chance to enclose the top. This puts him into the lead.

Figure 3 (56 – 87). Black dictates the pace.

White 58. White's only hope of staying in the game is to get a lot of points in this corner.

White 64. This forcing move guards against the possibility of Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.




Figure 3 (56 - 87)






Figure 4 (88 - 107)



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

White 72. If at 1 in Dia. 8, Black will be happy to move into the bottom with 2 to 6.

Black 81 is a clever probe. If White blocks at 1 in Dia. 9, Black 2 and 4 aim next at Black 'a'.

Black 87. The sealed move. Rin gets his revenge for the fourth game by stirring up a hornet's nest in Otake's corner.

Figure 4 (88 - 107). Rin's generosity

Black 89. Black 1 in Dia. 10 is simpler, but the result to 3 is boring.


White 90. If at 1 in Dia. 11, Black cuts at 2. After 3 to 8 -

Dia. 12. If White defends at 9, Black captures the white stones on the left.


Black 99 is an overplay - the easiest way for Black to finish off the game is to play 97 at 1 in Dia. 13.

Dia. 13. If White 2, Black cuts with 3, then attacks White's eye-shape with 5. If White 10 -


Dia. 14. Black kills White with the superb sequence to 19 (if 16 at 17, Black 'a'). Therefore -




Dia. 10




Dia. 11




Dia. 12



Dia. 13




Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Dia. 15. White must play at 1 instead of 10 in Dia. 13, though this lets Black play 2 and 4. Making an eye on the side would put Black's large group



Dia. 16


out of danger. In addition —

Dia. 16. Black is left with a sente seki.


The result in *Dia. 15* would have secured the game for Rin, especially since Black 4 there forces White to defend his cutting point at 'a'. Rin's intention with 99 was to finish off the game immediately, but he overlooked White 100. Instead—

Dia. 17. Rin expected White 1. After 2 to 8—


Dia. 18. Black wins the capturing race by two moves (White 'a' is countered by Black 'b').



Dia. 17



Dia. 18



Dia. 19

Black 103. Yet another mistake: Black should play down at 1 in *Dia. 19*. The long continuation given here was worked out by the players after the game, but it is nearly all forced. After White 26, Black captures, White throws in at 26, Black captures at 20, then White starts a ko with 'a'. The ko threat of 'b' would give Black sufficient profit.

Note that Black cannot capture 104, as White 'b' is sente, so his group is lost.

This is a startling setback for Black. First he misses out on unconditional life, then he lets slip a chance to get ko, then finally he gives his group away for nothing. In most professional games fighting over half-points is the rule, so such a reverse would usually be fatal.

Figure 8 (108 – 131). *Black wins anyway.*

For once, fortunately, Rin still had plenty of




Figure 8 (108 – 131)

time left. A calm reckoning of the score showed him that he was still ahead, so he regained his composure and carefully started on the endgame.

Black 21 is large. Rin felt certain of winning when he played here.

White has no satisfactory continuation after Black 31. He must guard against the combination of Black 'a' and Black 'b'. He can do so in sente with White 'c' but at the cost of two stones, or in gote with 'd', in which case Black switches to 'e'. Either way White cannot hope to win.

White resigns after 131.

Time taken. White: 4 hours 16 minutes

Black: 6 hours 59 minutes

(Adapted from commentaries by Rin Kaiho)

Game Six

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Otake Hideo

date: 1st, 2nd November, 1978

played at Ito City

Figure 1 (1 – 34). *Rin's bold beginning*

White 16. The taisha is a little unusual for Rin; more characteristic would be the territory-oriented sequence White 'a', Black 19, White 31. Since Black has omitted 29, White is aiming at his weak point at 'b'.

Black 29. Setting his two stones in motion with the usual joseki continuation of 1 to 5 in *Dia. 1* would only set up a nice attack for White at 6 or 'a'. Black is prepared to give up his two stones as he has ideal shape in the top right corner.





Figure 1 (1 – 34)



Dia. 1

White 34 astonished Otake — for a moment he must have wondered if his opponent really was Rin Kaiho. This is the kind of imaginative move that goes down in Go history *if* one wins the game. Once having played 30, capturing the two black stones with 'c' obviously seemed too petty to Rin. White 34 also aims at attaching at 'd' and even provides some indirect defence against Black 'e'. On the other hand it could easily end up as a wasted move if it is later cut adrift.

Figure 2 (35 – 66). *Otake is confident.*

Black 39. An excellent point. When Otake played here, he felt happy about his prospects, for he had the edge territorially. White resorts to a ko in order to try and make something of his stones at the top.

White 56 is forced. If at 2 in Dia. 2, Black is left with the sequence from 5 to 12 for later.

Black 57. Black considers this adequate compensation for the ko.

Black 65. A probe to sound out White's intentions.

White 66. The sealed move at the end of the first day. Answering at 'a' might be risky.






Figure 2 (35 – 66)

ko: 46, 51, 54; 60: connects



Dia. 2

4: elsewhere



Dia. 3

Figure 3 (67 – 80). *Black's successful invasion*

Black 67 starts a crucial fight. The variations here are endless.

White 70. If at 2 in Dia. 3, Black sacrifices three stones. This result is bad for White.




Figure 3 (67 – 80)

74: connects

Black with an excellent hane at 'e', but White's only concern is to take sente to play the combination of 112 and 114. This is his last hope.




Figure 5 (115 – 127)

Figure 5 (115 – 127). *The last mistake*


Black 15 and White 16 are natural, but White 18 is the losing move. After the sequence to 22 Black has the exquisite tesuji of 23 (this is the answer to the problem posed on page 3 of GW10). White can do nothing.

Dia. 5. If White 1, Black counters with 2 and wins the fight by one move. Note that if White plays 'a' and Black answers at 'b', White has the nasty move of 'c'. This is dangerous for Black due to his shortage of liberties on the right. For this reason Black cautiously defends with 27 in the figure.

Dia. 6. Black 1 here instead of 23 is a mistake. White saves his stones as 5 and 6 become miai.

Rin must have overlooked Black 23 when he

Diagram 5 consists of two Go board positions. The left board shows a sequence of moves numbered 1 through 12. White stones are numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11. Black stones are numbered 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12. Points 'a', 'b', and 'c' are marked on the board. The right board shows a different sequence of moves numbered 1 through 6. White stones are numbered 1, 3, 5. Black stones are numbered 2, 4, 6.



Dia. 5

Dia. 6

Continued on page 39


How to Improve at Fuseki (7)

Kato Honinbo

Sanren-sei (ii)

The most recent pattern

Dia. 1. In the previous issue we looked at the various answers Black can make when White plays $\triangle$: jumping to A, attaching at B or countering with a pincer at C or D. The remaining option for Black is to ignore White $\triangle$ altogether by switching to the large point of 1 at the bottom. This move was invented by Takemiya Masaki 9-dan about four years ago and it has become very popular.




Dia. 1


Black's reasoning is that White has no really good continuation at the top, so there is no need for him to decide immediately whether to answer on the right or to make a pincer.

White has two continuations at the top: a second approach move at 'a' or the invasion at 'b'.

Dia. 2. White 1 is common in handicap Go, but it feels just a little unreasonable in an even game. There are various ways for Black to answer, but 2 and 4 seem good enough. If White 5 and 7, Black moves out with 8, keeping the white forces



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

separated. Some difficult fighting lies ahead for White — he has to look after his solitary stone on the side, yet he is also exposed to a severe attack by Black at 'a'. Whatever happens, Black $\blacktriangle$ will prove very useful. Instead of 7 —


Dia. 3. If White plays 1, Black counters strongly by cutting at 2. Once again White is in trouble, as his forces are split into two.

One can conclude that White 1 in Dia. 2 is unreasonable and for this reason professionals hardly ever make this move in the sanren-sei pattern.

Dia. 4. If the second approach move is not satisfactory, we are left with the 3-3 invasion of White 1. Blocking at 2 is a mistake in direction by Black. After the joseki to 9, Black could get a passable result by pushing with Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd', but only if he had a stone at 'a' to begin with. Without this stone Black's thickness would be meaningless. Moreover, in this result White 9 looks very good, as it restricts the potential of Black's moyo at the bottom right. Instead of Black 6, however —



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 5. Blocking at 1 here is a strong move. If White 2, Black plays 3 with the aim of expanding his right side position. This strategy has been tried out by Hashimoto Utao 9-dan and is a good example of his ingenious play, but in general it might be safer not to imitate him. When one bears in mind the special nature of the sanren-sei, one is reluctant to recommend blocking at 2 in Dia. 4.

Takemiya's large moyo strategy

Dia. 6. The natural move is to block at 2, emphasising the right side. Black next takes the vital point of 4, then moves out with 6. The sequence so far could be called the definitive answer to the 3-3 invasion.




Dia. 6

At this point White most often switches elsewhere, but if he does answer at 7, Black just keeps on pushing with 8 and 10. This strategy, putting aerial pressure on White, was invented by Takemiya 9-dan, who is noted for his large-scale, centre-oriented style. Black 6 to 10 work in concert with ▲ to build up overwhelming influence in the right half of the board. If next White 'a', Black expands his moyo with 'b'; if White 'c', Black exchanges 'd' for White 'e', then starts a fight by cutting at 'a'.

Note that Black 6 is the key move. If Black omits 6, White will play at 'f' or 6 and at one stroke flatten out Black's moyo.

We said that the moves to 6 constitute the definitive version of the joseki, but White does have scope for variation along the way. Instead of connecting at 5 –

Dia. 7. White can also push up at 1. The sequence to 19 is considered the standard continuation. (The position comes from Game 2 of the 1978 Judan title; Rin is Black and Kato is White. Refer GW8.)




Dia. 7

Dia. 8. In a game between Cho Chikun (Black) and Kato in the 1977 Meijin league, Cho played 2 to 6 before forcing with 8 etc. The continuation after 19 was Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c',

White 'd', Black 'e'.


On reconsideration, there seems to be no room for improvement in both the above sequences.




Dia. 8

White's area in Dia. 7 looks big, but Black skillfully reduced it with the combination of Black 'a' and 'b'. Instead of 11 –

Dia. 9. White should make the diagonal connection at 1. This would virtually secure the top area.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Dia. 8 is also somewhat painful for White; perhaps I should have connected solidly at 8 instead of 7.


Note that White follows the proverb and captures the cutting stone in dias. 7 and 8.

Dia. 10. If Black cuts at 1, White makes a pon-nuki with 2 and 4, then jumps to 6. Suddenly the positions have been reversed and White has all the influence.

The above should demonstrate that Black 1 in Dia. 1 is a powerful strategy. Making a second approach move is not good for White, but entering at the 3–3 point does not necessarily produce a good result for him either, as Black can simplify the position. White does have another trick up his sleeve, however.

The Shimamura-style one-space jump


Dia. 11. The jump to White 3 was invented by Shimamura Toshihiro 9-dan. This kind of move is actually a bit of a blind spot for most players, but it seems to be quite effective. In contrast to the second approach move and the 3–3 invasion, this move is vague and hard to pin down. Jumping to 4 is the only move for Black, so White




Dia. 11

next invades at 5.

Dia. 12. Blocking at 1 is the only move—Black ‘a’, permitting White 1, would be bad. The moves to 6 follow, after which Black must attack around 7 or ‘b’ if he is to get anything out of the position. However, White can play ‘c’, so he can easily look after his stones. If White subsequently jumps to ‘d’, Black 7, which was supposed to be an attacking move, may on the contrary become a burden. One should not forget either that White 6 undermines Black’s right side moyo. This result is clearly favourable for White.



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

Dia. 13. The splendid sequence to 14 also appeared in a game. This result is assessed as equal, but White 2 is a little heavy.


Dia. 14. Dodging lightly with 2 here is more interesting. Black will connect at 3, so White runs at 4, getting a similar result to Dia. 12. The three white stones at the top are flexible stones ready to play an attacking role, so there is no worry about their being attacked.

The reason why both Dia. 12 and Dia. 14 are bad is that Black made a mistake with 3 in Dia. 12.

Dia. 15. (correct). Blocking at 3 here is better. The sequence to 6 seems to be the most recent ‘definitive’ version of this pattern. It is not easy to say whether White $\triangle$ is better here or at ‘a’, as



Dia. 14




Dia. 15


in the usual pattern, but one could perhaps maintain that the important role $\triangle$ plays in reducing Black’s moyo on the right makes this position preferable.
(‘Igo Club’, July, 1978)

All about the Pincer (7)

Takagawa Shukaku



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Problem 4 (continued)


Dia. 1. In order to defend his weakness at ‘a’, White may extend solidly at ‘b’, a move which we looked at in the last instalment of this article. Another possibility is the diagonal move at 2. How should Black continue?

Dia. 2 (crude). Pushing at 1 is crude, as it just helps White to make nice shape with 2 and 4.

Dia. 3 (toughest). Sealing White in with 2 is a good, strong move. You may be worried about the possibility of White ‘a’, Black ‘b’, White ‘c’, but as we will see, there is nothing to fear.




Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (solid outward influence). If White 1, Black has a nice move at 2. If White 3, Black

sacrifices his stone and builds up impressive strength on the outside.




Dia. 5

Dia. 6


Dia. 5 (correct shape). If White 3, Black 4, setting up the hane at 'a' next, is good shape. Even if White continues with 5 and 7, Black 8 is sente. White has no choice but to connect at 9, so Black can extend at 10. If White 11, Black plays 12 to prevent White 'b'. Black is clearly doing well.

Dia. 6 (double threat). If White answers 1 with 2, Black plays 3 and 5, threatening to cut at 'a' and 'b'.

Dia. 7 (Black takes control). If White protects one of the cutting points with 1, Black is happy to push along with 2 to 6. White gets some minor profit in the sequence to 11, but Black builds up strength which dominates the whole position.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 9


Dia. 8 (favourable for Black). If White defends on the other side, Black secures a base in the corner with 2 to 6, getting a favourable result. White of course cannot cut at 'a'.

Dia. 9 (magnificent). If White 1, Black cuts at 2. The ponnuki gives Black impressive strength.

Dia. 10 (variation). White may try 3 instead of 'a', so it is just as well to know how to deal with

this move.

Dia. 11 (White's ideal). If Black 1 and 3, White forces with 2 and 4, then jumps out at 8. The result to 10 is just what White wants. Black has only one eye in the corner.




Dia. 10

Dia. 11

In positions in which having a base in the corner is important –

Dia. 12 (a proper base). Black can make a forcing move at 1 before blocking at 3. It is true that White can aim at clamping at 'a' later on, but in that case Black should fearlessly fight the ko with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. White cannot lightly undertake this ko, as his whole group might be endangered if he loses it.




Dia. 12

Dia. 13

Dia. 13 (tricked). Black must be sure not to answer White 1 at 2. White 3 makes miai of 'a' and 'b', so Black's base in the corner crumbles away.

If Black feels that following Dia. 12 is too complicated or too risky, he does have two simple alternatives.

Dia. 14 (the key point). When Black attaches importance to the corner, the 3-3 point is the key point. Black 1 makes miai of attacking the three black stones and invading at 'a'.



Dia. 14


Dia. 15

Black 1 makes certain of one eye in the corner, thus strengthening Black sufficiently for any fighting here, but if Black feels insecure even with this —

Dia. 15 (on a grand scale). He can play 1, confining White to the edge with the sequence to 9. In some positions this large-scale strategy might be quite interesting.

If White plays 6 at 9, we get a similar result to Dia. 7.

Dia. 16 (handicap variation). White 3 is also often seen in handicap games. How should Black answer?




Dia. 16

Dia. 17


Dia. 17 (the key point). Once again Black 1 is the key point. There is now little that White can do. To give one example, if White jumps out to 2, Black has the nice combination of 3 and 5. White therefore cannot play 2.

Dia. 18 (large-scale). Black 1 and 3 are also effective. Black gets a magnificent position up to 11. Instead of 6 —

Dia. 19 (imposing). White may go for corner



Dia. 18



Dia. 19

profit with 1 and 3, but once again Black gets an imposing position with 4. Black can also play at 'a' if he wants to exploit the thinness of the white group above. If then White 4, we get the same result here as in the previous diagram.

If White cuts at 'b' after Black 'a', Black in turn cuts at 4 and should have no trouble in the ensuing fighting.


('Igo Club', August, September, 1978. This instalment concludes the series.)

Continued from page 34

played White 18. The correct sequence here is to force with 1 and 3 in Dia. 7, then to retreat at 11 after making the same invasion. This would have made the game close, though Black would still have a small lead.

Otake confesses that when he played 23 his hand trembled — partly from joy at winning this game, partly from relief that the long title match was finally over.

The moves in Figure 6 have little meaning — in fact, with 85 etc. the gap widened (if 85 at 86, Black 88 threatens the large white group). Perhaps Rin just needed some time for mental preparation before he could admit defeat and hand over his title.



Dia. 7




Figure 6 (128 - 205)

White resigns after 205.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes

Black: 6 hours 48 minutes

(From 'Kido' and 'Igo Club', January 1979)

The Art of Sacrifice

Cho v. Takagi

This game, from the penultimate elimination round for entry into the 34th Honinbo league, was one of the more startling games played last year. Cho Chikun made sacrifice after sacrifice until one wondered where he could find any more stones to give away.

White: Takagi Shoichi 8-dan

Black: Cho Chikun 8-dan

komi: 5½, time: 6 hours each

date: 16th November, 1978

Figure 1 (1 – 64). If White plays 38 at 39, then after Black 38, White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c',




Figure 1 (1 – 64)




Figure 2 (65 – 131)

ko: 113, 116, 119, 122, 125, 128, 131

Black 'd', White 'e', Black gets a nice ponnuki.

Black 43 etc. prepare the way for the large-scale sacrifice manoeuvre with 49 to 57. Other players were astonished by Cho's daring, but he gets a reasonable position.

Figure 2 (65 – 131). White 74 and 76 are crucial. Black 76 – White 'a' – Black 74 would strengthen Black and create a cutting point at 'b'.

Black 77 is aggressive; defending with Black 87 seems more urgent. White 77, Black 'c', White 'd' would follow, giving a close game. After 78 Takagi began to feel optimistic about his prospects.

With either 79 or 83 defending at 87 would still be safer. When White cuts at 84, Cho continues in his spectacular sacrificial vein. This time the result is not favourable – Black will have to take the whole bottom right area to gain compensation. When White succeeds in setting up a large ko, Black is in trouble.

Figure 3 (132 – 206). White has too many ko threats, so he finally gains life with 50. Now, if he can just reduce the top a little...

Black 73. If at 82, White squeezes with 'a', enabling him to catch Black 61, 67 and 69 in a ladder. In despair Black defends with 73, making the supreme sacrifice – his whole group at the bottom. However, his game is now beyond salvaging, so he finally resigns when White breaks through at 206.





Figure 3 (132 – 206)

ko: 37, 48; 50: connects; ko: 78, 81


GOOD AND BAD STYLE

Problem: Black to play




41


Vulgar Style




If Black begins with 1, he can only capture the two circled white stones.




42




The placement at 1 may look like a tesuji, but with 2 and 4 White captures the circled stones.




43



Black 1 is slack as White can cross underneath with 2. Black's whole group is still insecure.




44




Black must not begin with 1. White 2 and 4 prevent him from doing anything.


Correct style




Black 1, a combination of a peep and a placement, captures all the circled stones.




If White resists with 2, Black captures him with 3 to 7.




The placement at 1 is the real tesuji.




If White 2, Black kills the whole white group with 3 to 7.




The hane at 1 is the correct move.



If White 2, Black 3 — there is nothing that White can do.



Descending first at 1 is better. If White 2, Black cuts at 3.




Black gets nice forcing moves at 5 and 7 and effectively seals White in.


Life and Death Page

Test your imagination and reading ability on these twelve problems: Black to play. Par for the course is to get no more wrong than your kyu rating. Dan-rated players should be able


to get them all right, but that is not to say that they will. Arrangement is roughly in order of increasing difficulty. Answers begin on page 50.




1. Black to live




2. Black to kill




3. Black to live




4. Black to kill




5. Black to kill




6. Black to kill




7. Black to kill




8. Black to live




9. Black to kill



10. Black to kill



11. Black to kill




12. Black to kill

Practical Tactics and Tesuji


Rin Kaiho, 9-dan

This series of articles will cover positions that appear frequently in actual play but rarely in joseki books. I plan to concentrate on problems faced by Black in handicap games.




Problem

Problem. White has slid in at 1. If he had jumped to 'a', Black 'b' would be automatic, but how should Black answer this sliding move? There are basically two ways.



Dia. 1


Dia. 1: correct. The simplest and safest way is to make the diagonal contact play at 1 followed by the solid extension at 3. It may be slightly disadvantageous to have White play 2, but Black gets good shape. This is what I would recommend in handicap games.



Dia. 2


Dia. 2: correct. The other way is to occupy the 3-3 point. This aims at a pincer attack on either the top or the left side. It has the disadvantage, however, of leaving a less settled shape, so the continuation will be more difficult.

Now for White's benefit, let's see how he can take advantage of various mistakes that Black might make.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3: wrong. If Black makes the all too common diagonal move at 1, White takes the corner with 2 through 8. Not only does Black lose territory; his group as a whole is starting to be attacked.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4: wrong. Jumping down to 1 looks like correct shape, but it is not. White peeps at 2.




Dia. 5

Dia. 5: continuation. The result is similar to Dia. 3. Black defends at 9, but even so he is likely to be attacked.



Dia. 6

Dia. 6: wrong. Black's first contact play at 1 is all right, but not his second one at 3. White plays 4 and 6. Black 7 is a desperate effort to defend two places at once, but White has a tesuji at 8. Black 9 is another desperate move, but in spite of all these desperate efforts Black gets a bad result. White becomes too strong on the outside.



Dia. 7

Dia. 7: continuation. In addition, there is a ko left in the corner with White 1 through 5. If Black loses it, his eye space is gone.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'*, Nov. 1978. Translated by James Davies)

Annals of Handicap Go: Sekiyama v. Miki (1)

Commentary by Miyamoto Naoki, 9-dan

It was July, 1941 when triumph in the first Honinbo Tournament brought Sekiyama the highest prestige in the go world. Two years later, during the second game of the second tournament, he collapsed at the board, suffering acute abdominal pains caused by an incurable spinal disease, and had to withdraw from competition. Thirty-five years old, at his go-playing peak — no one can know how bitter this misfortune must have been for him. On top of it he was bombed out twice during the war, the end of which found him living in dire poverty in Tamashima in Okayama Prefecture. But all this did nothing to lessen his passion for the game of go. An amateur who used to visit him occasionally came away with fourteen teaching games, each of which had lasted over ten hours and taken two days. Playing through these thirty-year-old games has made a strong impression on me, so I would like to share a few of them with the reader.

Miki: 'Until the end of the war I was an instructor at the naval academy at Etajima. There was a temple across the channel on the mainland and the chief priest there introduced me to Segoe Kensaku, whom I visited at Itsukaichi on the outskirts of Hiroshima. He played me at five stones on the second floor of the building where the second game of the third Honinbo Tournament, the famous atomic-bomb game, was held.

'Carrying a letter of introduction from Segoe, I called on Sekiyama in October 1946. Between then and June 1949 he played me a total of eleven four-stone games (of which four were left unfinished) and three three-stone games. These




Figure 1 (1 – 23)

encounters with Sekiyama were the best fortune I have had in my life.'

White: Sekiyama Riichi

Black: Miki Masa*

August, 1947

Figure 1 (1 – 23)

Miki: 'Extending to White 3, or one line farther to the left, and making miai of 5 and 'a' was Sekiyama's favorite opening. He used it in six of our eleven games. If I made the usual low pincer with 6 one line to the right he would always make the diagonal jump at 7, so I played 6 high, but he played 7 anyway. The 1933 edition of the *Igo Daijiten* evaluates this diagonal jump as being good

*Miki is now the editor of *'Gekkan Gogaku'*.

for White both in handicap games and against a two-space pincer from the 3-4 point. One gets a glimpse here of the level at which the Suzuki pupils were exploring josekis.'

With 12 Black should either have made a knight's move at 15 or just pushed straight on at 13. If White attacked with 'b' or 'c' Black could defend at 'd' without the slightest risk. The urge to protect at 12 when White plays 7, 9 and 11 reveals a sort of inferiority complex.


Instead of gripping the white stone with 20, Black should have pushed at 21, or at least extended at 22. The result through 22 is the same as if Black had first played 22, White had played 21, then Black had retreated at 20.

Miki: 'When we spent over ten hours on a game, most of that time was taken up by Sekiyama's thinking. Since I had never played any game that lasted much more than one hour, I was rather dumbfounded. Once, suspecting that Sekiyama was putting me on, I got up and went to the toilet, then tiptoed back and peered in, but there he sat, intently reading out sequences. I became bored and tried to distract myself by making a game record, but he sternly rebuked me, saying he would show me the order of moves later. Thanks to that, I was able to get complete records of all these games, and for the succeeding thirty years I have kept the practice of recording my games, except for handicap games in which I held White,

while riding home on the train. Looking at these old game records brings back pleasant memories, but I notice a deplorable lack of improvement.'

Figure 2 (24 - 65)

Sekiyama on Black 24 etc.: 'Your thinking here - taking account of the fact that the right edge was open and trying to get to the key point at 31 - was correct, but instead of 26 and 28 you should have played 1 and 3 in Dia. 1, leaving 'a' and 'b' as miai.'



Seeing White ignore 30 and play 31 must have been a numbing experience for Black. His attempted handling of the corner had failed and the maneuver White had begun with 7 in the previous figure had ended in complete success. If Black now pushed through and cut, he would get Dia. 2. That would be the same as if he had played 1 to 8 in Dia. 3, then made an unnecessary gote move at 9. (Adding a white stone at 'a' and a black stone at 'b' to Dia. 3 gives Dia. 2)

This whole game went smoothly for White. He pursued the natural flow, playing correct, proper moves one after another, trying no tricks. Since he read everything out completely, no confusion arose on the board. This was an extremely well-tempered handicap game.

Miki: 'What was Sekiyama thinking about during all the hours of those two days? Although I was apparently the strongest amateur he was instructing at the time, I lacked the strength to play in accordance with his reading. If he had tried to fool me I would have collapsed without resistance, so he did not have to do all that thinking to win, and it was certainly not done for my instruction. What he was absorbed in was the game itself - the search for the best move.'






Figure 2 (24 - 65)

Black 32 at 51 would have been safer, and from 34 on Black simply went in the wrong direction. By 51 he had been chopped into pieces and White's central power was taking full effect. Black may have been trying to attack White 33, but his contact play at 34 contradicted that. He should have played 1 in Dia. 4. If White ignored this, Black would follow with a shoulder move at 'a'. If White played 2, Black could play 3; then if White 'b', Black 51 in the figure would be adequate.



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Black 36 would have been better at 1 in Dia. 5. White would probably connect at 4, after which Black could play at 51 in the figure. If White then played 'a', Black could defend with 'b'.

Black 40 should just have been 42. Next if White 43, Black 'a'.

As I seem to be repeating, 51 was a key point, and White's playing there suddenly made the game tense. Black now needed to put forth extra effort.

Black 52 was not a good idea. The three stones on the left side were weak and Black had to protect them, but despite 52, once White began to attack the upper left corner Black's left-side group became even weaker. Black needed to exercise his imagination and protect his left-side group indirectly by defending the upper left corner as in Dia. 6. Then, with only one weak group to care for, he would be in no trouble. He




Dia. 6

would have the knight's move at 'a' and the possibility of attacking White or linking to the upper left corner. But then, a player who could calmly defend the left side with 1 and 3 in Dia. 6 would not need a four-stone handicap.

White 55 prevented Black's knight's move a line below, took no small profit, and prodded Black into jumping to 56, upon which White jumped to 57. White was now linked up and Black, even after 58, was unstable in the face of White's thick center. The next figure will show how strongly White was able to attack. In view of that, at 56 Black should again have defended the corner with 63, protecting the left side indirectly.

White now played 59 in the upper right corner, threatening to peep at 'b'. This kept Black from getting good shape with 'c', and also lent support to 51 etc. on the left side. Black answered White's threat with 60 and 62, but White 61 removed the push-through and cut mentioned earlier. Dia. 7 would have been a better sequence to follow.



Dia. 7

Starting in the lower left corner, White had touched bases on the left side and the upper right corner. Now with 63 and 65 he returned to the upper left corner and left side to attack. The ripples from this attack could be expected to reach the lower left corner, and behind it all shone the center thickness he had built up starting with 7 in Figure 1.

Figure 3 (66 – 87)

Black's only real choice for 66 was to connect at 69. Concern for the left side must have made him play 66 and 68, but these moves ultimately had the reverse of the desired effect.





Figure 3 (66 - 87)

Holding Black 70 in reserve and playing 75 would have been correct shape. White 77, Black 70, White 71, Black 'a', White 73, and Black 'b' (linking up) could have followed.

Black 74 was the game-losing move. White's pushing in at 75 mangled Black's shape. With 74, Black should have linked up at 1 in Dia. 8.



Dia. 8

If White cut at 2, then would be the time for Black 3. If White played 4 to 8, Black could gain a liberty with 9 and 11 and win the fight by one move. If White played 4 at 7 Black could play 'a', sacrificing two stones and squeezing.

In the previous figure I pointed out how Black should have protected the left side by first solidifying the corner. This time, before playing 74 he should have solidified himself at 1 in Dia. 8; then defending the upper side would have been easy. I sympathize with Black in this game, however. Confronted with White's awesome power, it was understandably hard to find the imagination needed to defend correctly. Black's moves ended up as a series of half-measures, and White


exposed their defects with steady precision. I felt exactly the same way as a boy when Hashimoto Utao played me at four stones.

Black 84 was another mistake. Black was constantly worrying about the left side, but all the moves he made there gained him next to nothing. Black 84 lost him a liberty and set up a snap-back against 66 and 68; this not only cost him territorial profit, but also made it harder to defend his side group.


White 87 was beautifully timed. White's moves were always right on the mark, and Black's troubles were growing worse and worse.

Figure 4 (88 - 117)

Before retreating with Black 96, my first inclination would be to play Black 1 in Dia. 9. White's cutting with 2 and 4 is the chief danger, but if Black persists at 7, takes sente and plays 11, the outcome will probably be that both sides live.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Black should have connected at 5, not played 4. In Dia. 10 Black 3 keeps White from cutting at 'a', and with 4 and 5 as miai Black's left-side group is safe. If White plays 4 immediately, Black plays 5 and has two eyes. If White plays 4 around 5, no matter how he proceeds he ends in gote and Black has one eye left. Black then plays 4. White's left-side group is in danger, so he cannot stop Black from getting a second eye with 'b'. If White could have killed Black by connecting at 2, he would not have started on a detour with 3 in the figure.

Having profited in the lower left, White skipped over to the upper side with 7, firmly attacking Black's upper left corner while enlarging his own upper-side territory. Black was being




Figure 4 (88 - 117) 1=101

led in circles by White, always a step behind.

Black should not have cut at 8; just 12 and 14 would have been better. Then he would have had various ways to force White in the center, which he lost when White played 11.


Black finally got all his groups safely settled, but no sooner had he done so than White slid in to 17. This hurt even more than being attacked. Black was now pretty clearly behind in the balance of territory.

Figure 5 (118 - 133)

Miki: 'We used to play for eight hours on the first day, with a break for lunch. Evening would arrive at about the hundredth move and we would stop with White to play. On the second day we would finish up rather more quickly. This game was over especially quickly because I resigned at White 133, slightly past noon I believe. Then, as always, Sekiyama went over the game carefully for me. I remember that he said about White 119, "This is a move I'm proud of," looking immensely pleased, more so than with anything else during all our fourteen games. He thought hard over every single move, never playing a stone until he had determined the best place for it,

and this game was already going against Black, so the special praise he bestowed on White 119 made a lasting impression on me. There must have been a detailed explanation as to why it was so good, but I do not remember it. Perhaps I was too weak at the time to understand it, even when I heard it.'

White 19 was indeed a deep move. It (1) prepared to open up the right side, (2) defended White's center and (3) prepared to attack Black. The simplest reply to Black 18 would have been to capture the black stone as in Dia. 11, but then Black 3 would end White's chances of getting into the right side,



Dia. 11

and make a little territory in the center. This might not put Black back in the lead, but at least it would make the game worth finishing. White 2 in Dia. 11 would have been purely defensive.





Figure 5 (118 - 133)

The first purpose of White 19 was realized by White 33, at which point Black resigned. If he had tried to capture White's stone, the circled stone in Dia. 12 (19 in the figure) would have been his downfall. When Black cuts at 6, White just plays 7.



The second purpose of White 19 was the defense of the center. Black's strongest attack there was 1 and 3 in Dia. 13, but once again the circled stone makes its presence felt and Black has to go back to reinforce at 5, letting White start a ko. Sekiyama had doubtlessly read out the entire course of this ko fight and calculated the profit and loss. I expect that is what he was so pleased about.

White has two local ko threats at 'a' and 'b', and if Black loses the ko, the life and death of his left-side group comes into question. If he can hane and connect ('c-d-e') in sente he lives, but

White will respond with a throw-in at 'f', leaving Black burdened with a loss there.


Even if Black wins the ko and captures the five white stones, he probably does not profit, since White gets two moves in a row while Black connects. ('If' and 'probably' are being rather rude to Sekiyama, who must have had the best moves for both sides all precisely figured out before he put 19 on the board.)

Miki: 'In everything related to the game of go Sekiyama was a stern, old-fashioned master—he referred to go books as "go sutras" for example — but in everything else he was a bright, merry man whom all addressed by the diminutive form of his first name. Few people seemed to be coming to him for instruction right after the war, and how he managed to make ends meet playing two-day games for the tiny sum that a freshly started office worker could afford to pay, I do not know. His merriness must have come from forgetting himself completely in his games, even against weaker opponents. Despite his illness, he was never anything but cheerful towards his wife and three growing children. We recently marked the seventh Buddhist anniversary of his death, but looking back, I feel as if whenever I entered his humble house I was stepping into a fairy-tale wonderland.'


('Igo Shincho' July 1978. Translated by James Davies. This is part 1 of a three-part series.)

ANSWERS TO LIFE AND DEATH PROBLEMS


Answer to No. 1




Black 1, the eye-protecting tesuji, is the only move. Giving atari as below fails.




Answer to No. 2




A simple hane murder. The diagram below gives a variation.



Answer to No. 3




The diagonal move at 1 is the only move that works. It makes one eye to the right and one to the left, so Black is alive.




Connecting at 1 fails. Next if Black 'a', White 'b' and vice versa.

Answer to No. 4




There is no choice about Black 1. White tries to capture with 2, but Black 3 catches him in a shortage of liberties.




This Black 1 is a quick failure

Answer to No. 5




The placement at 1 is the killing move. If White blocks with 2, Black plays 3. Next if White 'a', Black 'b'.




This clamp does not work; White lives with the hane at 2, making 'a' and 'b' miai.

Answer to No. 6




The hane at 1 is the tesuji. White plays 2, but Black connects solidly at 3 and White has no way to continue.




If Black connects with 1, White 2 makes a living shape.

Answer to No. 7




Black feeds White a sacrifice with 1. If White captures it with 2, Black 3 kills him.




If White connects with 2, Black squeezes him with 3 and 5.

(continued next page)

Answer to No. 8




Dipping down at 1 is a clever move. If White plays 2, Black makes a second eye by crawling at 3.




If Black descends at 1, White wedges in at 2 and kills him with 4 and 6.

Answer to No. 9




White succumbs to the placement at 1. If he captures with 2, Black hanes at 3. White cannot play 'a', so he is dead.




If Black connects at 1, White takes the key point at 2 and lives.

Answer to No. 10




The throw-in at 1 is brilliant. If White 2, Black 3—note the snap-back.




If White captures with 2, Black turns in at 3. Next 'a' and 'b' are miai.

Answer to No. 11




Black starts quietly by connecting at 1 (or 'a'). If White widens his eye space with 2, Black enters at 3.




Next if White 4, Black 5 is the finishing blow.

Answer to No. 12



Black pushes in at 1, then skips to 3 and White is dead. If White 'a', Black 'b'. But if Black plays 1 at 2, White 1 means a ko or a seki.




Black 1 here is a complete failure.

(From a supplement to 'Gekkan Gogaku', Jan. 1979)

New Joseki


Recent professional innovations in joseki
selected and reported on by
Abe Yoshiteru, 8-dan




Dia. 1

White's large knight's pressing move (taisha) in Dia. 1 was my final pick for 1978. It appeared when Black invaded at 9 in the game figure. Black makes this invasion to see how White will respond and, depending on the response, to strengthen his right side.


Dias. 2 to 4 show what have been White's standard responses. Jumping to 1 in Dia. 2 has been the most common, and the sequence through 5 is a joseki. The small knight's pressing move at 1 in Dia. 3 is also played, and there have been games in which White simply made the attachment at 1 in Dia. 4. It must have been in the hope of a better result than these three diagrams that White played his new move.




Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Ishida answered it by making the knight's move at 11 in the figure instead of attaching at 14, but the attachment is the better bet. One possible variation is shown in Dia. 5 (White 3 to 7), but what the player of the new move probably had in mind was wedging in at 3 in Dia. 6.




Game Figure (1 - 33) Kisei Tournament

White: Hashimoto Uтарo, 9-dan

Black: Ishida Yoshio, 9-dan

One can then predict Black 4 to 12, but one despairs of predicting what will come next. White may have felt that the exchange of the triangled stones was in his favor, the black one being slightly out of place ('a' would be its proper location).



Dia. 6

The continuation from Dia. 6 has been studied by Kudo, 9-dan, Sato, 7-dan, Cho, 8-dan, Take-miya, 9-dan, Haruyama, 7-dan, the writer, and others, but so far no one has been able to discover what trick Hashimoto had up his sleeve. Figure 1 (next page) is from the Judan Tournament. Black won, but the variation from 12 onward is certainly not bad for White. Figure 2 is from the Honinbo Tournament. Again Black won, and this time the sequence from 18 to 28 is judged to be slightly in his favor. These are two of the variations that have been tried.

Fujisawa Shuko has expressed approval of






Figure 1. Kudo (black) v. Kaji

Hashimoto's new move. Ishida tried to dodge it, but I wish he hadn't, so that we could have seen the definitive continuation from Dia. 6.



Dia. 7. 20 takes ko



Dia. 8





Figure 2. Cho (black) v. Sato

Some more or less convincing possibilities, according to current thinking, are shown in Dias. 7 to 9. In Dia. 7, assume that there are no outside ko threats. Dias. 8 and 9 seem good for White. Note how Black 4 is stranded in Dia. 8.



Dia. 9

('Igo Shincho' Nov. 1978. Translated by J. Davies)

Do-It-Yourself Commentary Workshop

Develop Your Critical Powers

The figures below show twenty moves from an amateur game. Read through them and score each move on the scale at right, filling in the chart at the bottom of the next page. When you are done, compare your scoring with that of Ishii, 9-dan, which follows.




Figure 1 (19 - 21)




Figure 2 (22 - 24)

- 5 Superlative
- 4 Good
- 3 Mediocre, or Necessary*
- 2 Doubtful
- 1 Bad

*Connecting against an atari, etc.




Figure 3 (25 - 27)




Figure 4 (28 - 31)




Figure 5 (32 - 35)





Figure 6 (36 - 38)

Scoring Chart

Move	Score	Move	Score
Black 19		White 20	
Black 21		White 22	
Black 23		White 24	
Black 25		White 26	
Black 27		White 28	
Black 29		White 30	
Black 31		White 32	
Black 33		White 34	
Black 35		White 36	
Black 37		White 38	



Reference Figure (1 - 18)

Scoring and Commentary by Ishii Shinzo, 9-dan




Figure 1 (19 – 23)


Black 19. A big point, but a mediocre move. Black is trying to do too much. 3 points.

White 20. A typical good move – ordinary, but on just the right spot. 4 points.


Black 21. A key defensive move, but there is also a sense in which Black is asking for trouble. It is a hard choice, but 22 might have been better. 4 points.

White 22, Black 23. Miai. Good moves, but considering the strength of the players, it seems more appropriate to call them necessary. 3 points each.

Dia. 1. To return to Black 19, Black should have approached the corner from this direction. White 2 and 4 are the normal continuation, so Black gets to make the hane at 5 (we shall see in a moment why this is important) or to approach the upper right corner.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2


Dia. 2. Another possibility for White 20 was

the pincer at 1. Black would probably jump out with 2 and 4, but that induces White 5, and now White has the initiative in the game because he is attacking the two circled stones.



Dia. 3


Dia. 3. With 21, Black could have gained a quick life by descending at 1. White would probably jump to 2, so Black could still play 3. But White would then get the key offensive-defensive point at 4, so it is hard to say whether this is better than the actual game or not. Since he has room to slide in at 'd', perhaps Black could play 3 at 'a', followed by White 'b' and Black 'c'; that might be more efficient.



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Behind all this activity in the upper left lies something else of which we must be aware, namely the possible white invasion at 1, which is surprisingly strong. If Black caps it with 2, White simply moves out at 3 and Black has no good reply. After Black 8, White need only play 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' to hold the advantage.


Dia. 5. When Black makes the triangled knight's move White can also counterattack with 1. Next should come the lettered sequence, with White breaking through at 'd'. If Black answers 1 by blocking at 'b', White wedges in



Dia. 5

at 'a', cutting off the four circled stones.

Dia. 6. For that reason, the best way for Black to pick up the pieces after White's invasion is to jump to 2 and continue through 10. White, however, takes control of the center by jumping ahead with 11, and Black is at a clear disadvantage.



Dia. 6

All the moves so far, including the 22–23 exchange, were evaluated with Dia. 6 in mind.




Figure 2 (24 – 30)

White 24. A good move (4 points). White does well to keep Black separated.

Black 25. One can see what Black is trying to do, but —. 2 points.

White 26. Necessary. 3 points.


Black 27. 1 point. A bad mistake. There is no way this move compensates for giving White a ponnuki.

White 28. A necessary move (3 points) made with a deep feeling of gratitude.

Black 29. A necessary move (3 points) probably made with a deep feeling of regret.


White 30. Exactly right, but too much of a standard move to be called superlative. 4 points.

Dia. 7. To demonstrate how much White gained in the exchange through 30, let's break it down by removing the two stones at the x's. We then have Black 'invading' at 1 and White closing the corner at 2. Need we say which move is better?




Dia. 7

Dia. 8. The commonest way to answer White's attachment at 1 is with Black 2 to 6, and that would have been good enough. Now Black 'a' would be a real threat, White would have to make a defensive move, and Black could use sente to approach the upper right corner or play the hane at 5 in Dia. 1.



Dia. 8




Dia. 9


Dia. 9. Black should not rush by making the diagonal move at 1 before 6 in Dia. 8, because of White 4.

Dia. 10. (next page) What Black was hoping with 25 and 27 was that White would answer with 2, 4, and 6. Agreed, this would give Black a big lead, but —

Dia. 11. The correct continuation from the wedge was something like Black 3 and 5. Next White connects at 'a'.




Dia. 10




Dia. 11

Dia. 12. Black simply has to abandon the diagonal move at 1. If he plays it here, White's hane at 4 puts his triangled stones in a tight fix.




Dia. 12




Dia. 13

Dia. 13. White must not let fear of the cut make him connect at 1 (instead of playing 4 in *Dia. 11*). The result through 6 is very bad for him.

Dia. 14. What made Black play a move like 27? The expectation of *Dia. 10* was part of it, but I am afraid that another factor was his misinterpretation of his three circled stones as a weak group. The main value of capturing the triangled white stone is not that it stabilizes Black's group but that it steals White's eye space in the corner. Consider White 1 to Black 4 for example.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Dia. 15. White therefore defends the trian-

gled stone with 1, and he can further play around the x's in sente, but Black is still safe. When the need arises he can live by playing the hane at 2 (if White 'a', Black 'b'). He has a light, easily manageable shape.




Figure 3 (30 - 38)

Black 31. A mediocre 3 points. Large, but not as large as 32 or 33.

White 32 and Black 33. *Miai* and both excellent points. Could White have gotten both of them? 4 points apiece. I'm not going to award 5 points for anything that is not absolutely the best move on the board.

White 34. 3 points. Mediocre, not necessary.


Black 35. 3 points. This one is necessary.

White 36. The key point for both sides' frameworks. 5 points.

Black 37. Necessary, or nearly so. 3 points


White 38. Wrong direction. 2 points.

Dia. 16. Black 31 would have been a fine move if White's circled corner enclosure had been on the fourth line. Next Black 'a' would be large, so White would check Black by extending immediately to 2. Black could then jump to 3, or extend at 'b'.




Dia. 16

Dia. 17. For the same reason, in the actual game Black 1 was an urgent move. If White expanded his framework with 2, Black could reduce it with 3, or by attaching at 'a'.




Dia. 17




Dia. 18

Dia. 18. If White jumped to 2, Black could consider this a forcing exchange and let White continue with 'a'. White 'a' would be easier to tolerate than a white extension at 'b'. Black would still have potential at 'c' etc.

Dia. 19. Speaking of forcing exchanges, this would not be one, because it would destroy the invasion at 'a'.




Dia. 19




Dia. 20

2 elsewhere

Dia. 20. In the same way White 34 was un-called for. White should have done nothing here. If Black extended to 3, White could still aim



Dia. 21




Dia. 22

at 'a' and 'b'. White 3, Black 'c' made it difficult for White to invade.

Dia. 21. After 37 the question of Black's pushing through and cutting with 1 and 3 arises. If White has a stone at the circled point, however, he need not worry. The sequence through 10 gives him a won game.

Dia. 22. When White played 38 (the circled move) he was thinking of 1 next, and 'a' after that. If Black were to play at the circled point, he could then play 'b'. All this, however, is comparatively small.

Dia. 23. I would recommend White 1 and 3 in this diagram. This would take care of Black 'a' and create a magnificent framework on the right side, giving White and overpowering lead.



Dia. 23

Scoring Chart

Black 19	3	White 20	4
Black 21	4	White 22	3
Black 23	3	White 24	4
Black 25	2	White 26	3
Black 27	1	White 28	3
Black 29	3	White 30	4
Black 31	3	White 32	4
Black 33	4	White 34	3
Black 35	3	White 36	5
Black 37	3	White 38	2
Total	29	Total	35

This game was contributed by an amateur shodan in Osaka, who played Black. He impresses me as the kind of player who is good at pushing weaker opponents around, but here he met his match. White upset his schemes and won by resignation.

('Gekkan Gogaku', Aug. 1978. Translated by J. Davies)

Correcting The Mistake

Kato Masao, Honinbo

The sequence at right came up in a four-stone handicap game. White turned at 1. Black, a five kyu player, thought for a while then muttered, 'Can't be helped,' and connected at 2. His obvious dissatisfaction with his move was justified. White played 3 and 5, giving him a dismal result. How should Black have played here?

A gentleman watching the game had a suggestion. 'It's bad shape, but I would turn at 1 in Dia. 1. If White plays 2, then Black 'a' is good shape.'


Another kibitzer had a different theory. 'In this kind of position the tesuji is to play immediately at 1 in Dia. 2. If White plays 2, Black gives atari at 3.'

Which of these two was correct? Let's take Dia. 2 first. The proposer of it had a sharp eye for tesuji to be able to see Black 1 and 3 so quickly. If White plays 2 then Black 3, followed by White 'a' and Black 'b', certainly gives Black an ideal result. There is, however, a serious flaw in this argument.


'What if White plays 2 here?' I said, showing Dia. 3. 'Hmm,' was the reply.

'Hmm' indeed. Black's two cutting stones are captured. If Black plays 'a', White 'b'. If Black 'b', White 'a'. If Black 'c', White 'd'.


How about Dia. 1 then? I rather like this move. It is strong and pragmatic, the move of a man who




The Mistake



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3


thinks for himself. It shows the right idea and is almost correct, but it leaves the problem of White 'b' in the future, so it is not quite perfect.

The correct move is the ordinary diagonal connection at 1 in Dia. 4. As is so often true in go, you need not hunt for anything exotic. The ordinary move is enough. Of course this 'ordinary' is a difficult thing. It often takes a strong player to play the ordinary move.


After Black 1, if White plays 'a', Black plays at 'b'. The side and center should be treated as miai. If White plays in the center, at 'b' for example, Black can attack strongly with 'c'. In actual play White would probably try to defend the side in sente, starting with 'd' perhaps, then play in the center too, but Black can deal with that when it happens.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

I was explaining all this, in less time than it has taken to write it, when another onlooker spoke up. 'Can't Black make the diagonal play here?' he asked in a timid voice, showing Dia. 5.

'He certainly can,' I had to answer. 'That's an excellent move. It hadn't occurred to me.' This last statement was not really true. Black 1 had occurred to me, but I had not expected to be asked about it. I had thought I could get by with explaining Dia. 4. I did not expect my listeners to pursue me this far.


Dia. 5 has the drawback that White can give atari at 'a' in sente, but at the same time it makes the strongest attack on White's four-stone group, so it is not easy to say whether it or Dia. 4 is better. But be that as it may, Dia. 4 is the ordinary move. You can't go wrong with it.

Black must not block at 1 in Dia. 6. White plays the clamping tesuji at 2, and through 6 Black has been nicely had. If he descends with 3 at 4, White cuts at 5; that would be a disaster.

(*Gekkan Gogaku* Oct. 1978. Translated by James Davies)

Advanced Tesuji Problems: Takemiya 9-dan

1. *Black to play.* The ladder at 'a' does not work, but Black can still make good use of his two stones.




Answers to Tesuji Problems


Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1 (failure). Black 1 is useless — Black can do nothing after White 2.


Dia. 2 (helping the opponent). If the two stones can't be saved, the obvious answer is to use them as a sacrifice. Black 1, however, just helps White to solidify his territory.




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: wrong



Dia. 3: correct




Dia. 4

Dia. 3 (the answer). Black 1 is a clever way to set up the sacrifice.


Dia. 4 (breakthrough). If White 1, Black breaks through into White's territory with 2 etc. This way he has no regrets about giving up his two stones.

Answer to Problem 2


Dia. 1 (wrong). White 1 is too crude — Black resists with 2, creating a defect in White's shape which enables him to escape with 8 when White attacks with 7.




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: correct



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 2 (good style). White 1 is a smart move which guarantees the safety of the seven white stones.


Dia. 3 (a loose ladder). If Black attempts to capture White with 1, White sets up a loose ladder (yurumi-shicho) with 2 to 8.

Dia. 4 (success). Black must defend with 2, but now the pressing move (kake) of 3 works. The three black stones are trapped.


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1 (unsatisfactory). If Black 1, White of course captures with 2. Black can play 3, but he loses the forcing move of 'a' (that is, if he plays 'a', he can no longer squeeze with 3).


Dia. 2 (the tesuji). Black 1 is more efficient.




Dia. 1: not enough



Dia. 2: correct



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 3 (nice for Black). If White 1, Black is happy to connect underneath with 2. If White connects the two stones, Black can play at 'a', threatening to kill White's corner group, but this is too much to hope for.

Dia. 4 (the forcing move). White has no choice but to play at 1, whereupon Black plays 2 and 4. This way Black gets both the Δ forcing move and the squeeze.


The Go Saint Dosaku

Two players in Japanese Go history have been accorded the title of Kisei or Go Saint: Dosaku in the 17th century and Shusaku in the 19th century. Dosaku, the 4th Honinbo, was the first great Go genius of the Edo period – he towered above his contemporaries and laid the foundations for the prosperity of the Honinbo house. In addition, the contributions he made to the development of Go theory have led many to see in his games the dawn of modern Go.

Dosaku was born in Shimane prefecture in 1645, thus making him a close contemporary of the haiku poet Basho. His original name was Yamazaki Sanjiro. He learnt Go at the age of 7 and when he was 15 or 16 went to Edo to become a disciple of the 3rd Honinbo Doetsu, being given then the name of Dosaku. When Doetsu retired in 1677, he appointed Dosaku as his heir and recommended to the government that he be appointed as Meijin Godokoro.

In 1678, when the appointment of Dosaku as Meijin Godokoro was approved by the government, there was not one objection from the other Go schools, something unique in Go history. The reason was that Dosaku simply outclassed all potential rivals. When Dosaku entered the Honinbo school, its main rival, the Yasui school, was enjoying its heyday under the leadership of the second Yasui Sanchi, who was Meijin Godokoro from 1668 to 1676. However, his leading disciples, such as Santetsu (oldest son of the 1st Yasui head Santetsu), Chitetsu (the second son) and Shunchi, soon found that they were no match for Dosaku. On even they hardly ever won and were all forced to handicaps of a stone or more. In the opinion of the late Maeda Nobuaki 9-dan, Dosaku was nearly two stones stronger than his nearest rival, a state of affairs unique in Go history.

The Yasui players had long been known as strong fighters but poor theoreticians; Dosaku was a stronger fighter and, on top of that, a pioneering theoretician. He was especially skilful at controlling the flow of a game by sacrificing and he developed the technique of *tewari* (a method of analysis in which one evaluates the efficiency of a sequence by removing superfluous stones or changing the order of moves in order to examine the basic structure). The first game illustrates



Game 1. Figure 1 (1–42)

this side of Dosaku's genius.

Game One. Dosaku v. Chitetsu

White: Dosaku (1645 – 1702)

Black: Yasui Chitetsu (? – 1700)

played in 1674. White wins by 5 points.

Figure 1 (1–42)

Black 3, 9. These pincers are the traditional Yasui style. At times Dosaku would skilfully sacrifice the pincered stone (White 2 or 6); at other times he would use it to seize the initiative.

White 8. This is where Dosaku takes advantage of the Yasui school's theoretical blindspots. When Chitetsu makes his favourite pincer at 9, Dosaku presses down on him with 12, forcing him into a low and over-concentrated position at the top. Nowadays everyone knows that this kind of development is bad for Black, but we owe this conventional wisdom to Dosaku.

The combination of 26 and 28 is also skilful; if White plays 28 first, Black of course extends to 26. When White sacrifices two stones with 30 and 32, Black's position at the top becomes even more over-concentrated.

Black 37. There are too many black stones in this direction already. Black should omit 37 and press at 39 immediately. If White 'a', then Black 40, White 'b', Black 'c' would be reasonable.

At this early stage of the game Black already seems to have got into an inferior position. The difference in fuseki ability is striking.




Figure 2 (43 – 100)




Figure 3 (101 – 150)




Figure 4 (151 – 200)




Figure 5 (201 – 261)

37, 58: connect

Figure 2 (43 – 100)

The focus of the game is how much territory Black can realise with his moyo at the bottom. Black 85 and 87, provoking 86 and 88 respectively, are bad, as they injure Black's prospects at the bottom. Black 85 at 'a' would be better, while 87 at 'b' would still salvage something.

Figure 3 (101 – 150)

White 6 at 11 would be sufficient, but White makes an aggressive invasion. When Black tamely plays 25 instead of the hane at 27, White has no trouble saving his stones.

261 moves. White wins by five points.

(Note. In 1696, on the retirement of his father Sanchi, Chitetsu became the 3rd head of the Yasui house).

Game Two. Dosaku v. Doetsu

White: Honinbo Dosaku

Black: Honinbo Doetsu (1636 – 1727)

played in 1681. White wins by resignation.

This famous game is known in Go history as 'the secret game record demonstrating Dosaku's maturity', though actually there was nothing secret about it. It was played after Doetsu had retired and Dosaku had already become Meijin Godokoro, but it was considered Dosaku's first convincing win with white against his teacher. Surprisingly, however, the fuseki is of a lower standard than the earlier game against Chitetsu.

Figure 1 (1 – 43)

Black 21. This tenuki is bad. If Black is going to play 21, he should omit the 15–20 exchange.




Figure 1 (1 - 43)




Figure 3 (101 - 154)




Figure 2 (44 - 100)

White 24. White 'a' is clearly more urgent.

Black 43. The losing move, according to Go Seigen. Since White omitted to play 42 at 'b', Black should attack with 'c' (White 'd' and Black 'e' would follow).

Figure 2 (44 - 100)

White 50 is well-judged. White 'a' would be too deep, as it would let Black make a nice attack at 'b'.

Black 77 and 79 are a nice combination. If Black 77 at 'c', White strikes at 'd'.

Figure 3 (101 - 154)

White 14. Almost certainly a mistake in the record, according to Go Seigen. This must be at 'a'.

Black 33 is necessary to maintain territorial balance, but Black is unable to save his group

at the bottom, so he resigns after 154.

Although Dosaku's supremacy as a player remained unchallenged, his life was not without its setbacks. The great misfortune of his life was the premature death of his heir Ogawa Doteki (1669 - 90), who had shown astonishing potential as a child. Doteki might even have surpassed his teacher, but he died at the age of twenty-one, six years after being appointed the Honinbo heir. (A game between the two is given in GW5.) In 1692 Dosaku made Sakugen (1675 - 99), a young player considered second only to Doteki, his heir, but Sakugen also died before he could inherit the title. Dosaku also saw two other leading disciples, Hasseki and Honseki, die young.

These successive tragedies must have blighted the latter part of Dosaku's life. The urgent problem of the Honinbo succession was not resolved until just before Dosaku's death, with the discovery of the young genius Kamiya Dochi (1690 - 1727). Virtually on his deathbed, Dosaku arranged for Dochi to become his heir. As a result, three months after Dosaku's death in March 1702, Dochi officially became the 5th Honinbo at the tender age of twelve. Fortunately, Dosaku's judgement had not been awry and Dochi proved to be a worthy successor.

Note. Dosaku's 'lifetime masterpiece', a 2-stone game against Yasui Shunchi, is given in Ohira's 'Appreciating Famous Games'. Another Dosaku game, against Yasui Santetsu, is analysed in detail in 'Master Go', Go Review, Summer 1974.

